The Many Faces of the Economic Substance’s Two-Prong Test:
Time for Reconciliation?
Yoram Keinan*
The fall of 2004 saw the occurrence of several important developments in relation to
the ongoing debate on the application of the economic substance doctrine. It started
with the issuance of the opinion in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States1 in the
end of August, a case in which a District Court held that a transaction involving the
contribution of stock with a built-in loss to a partnership lacked economic substance
and had been entered into without any business purpose other than tax avoidance. The
court upheld penalties assessed by the IRS despite the taxpayer’s argument that it
obtained and relied on two "should" level opinions supporting its position.
During the fall, the Jobs Act of 2004 was finalized and finally signed by the president on
October 22, 2004, leaving out the proposed codification of the economic substance
doctrine. Subsequent to the Government’s victory in Long Term Capital Holding v.
United States,2 three District Courts have held for the taxpayers in cases involving an
economic substance analysis. First, in Black & Decker Corp. v. United States3a U.S.
District Court has granted Black & Decker Corp.'s motion for summary judgment in its
refund suit for over $ 57 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability
transaction, on the grounds that the transaction had economic substance. Second, in
TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States4 a U.S. District Court (in the Second Circuit) has ordered
the IRS to refund $ 62 million to TIFD, the tax matters partner of Castle Harbour-I LLC,
applying the economic substance doctrine and finding that the LLC's creation was not a
sham designed solely to avoid taxes) Finally, in Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States5 a
U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ordered the IRS to refund to Coltec Industries Inc. $
82.8 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction, almost similar
to the one in Black & Decker, on the grounds that the transaction satisfied the statutory
language and requirements and, only as a backstop, applying the economic substance
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doctrine to conclude that the transaction had both business purpose and economic
substance.6
These events have emphasized the controversial application of the doctrine, and how
divided are courts, the Government and taxpayers in their interpretation of the doctrine.
In a previous article, this author has explored the profit potential issue, an ongoing
debatable issue in relation to the doctrine.7 This article will focus on another unsettled
issue, namely the application of the two- prong test. Frank Lyon v. United States8 has
been construed to establish a two-prong standard for examining if a transaction lacks
economic substance. Under the general two-prong test described in greater detail herein,
the economic substance doctrine is based on an objective and subjective determination of
whether a transaction has real, nontax economic benefit.9 Nevertheless, since Frank
Lyon v. United States, the United States Supreme Court has not issued an important
decision involving economic substance analysis, and interpretations of the doctrine
subsequent to Frank Lyon v. United States was left to the circuits. As a result, circuits
and courts are divided with respect to the application of the two-prong test, and several
variations have emerged, each of which may result in a different way.
This article will present the competing views regarding the application of the two prong
test, and suggest a practical solution to reconcile these differences. The conclusions
advanced are that the two-prong test ought to be collapsed into a single objective test,
which would generally consist of the current objective prong.
I.

History

The following is an overview of some of the landmark economic substance cases. A
more comprehensive discussion of these cases is set forth below.

6

See also Antantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, (equipment sale and leaseback transactions designed to
practice tax benefits through membership in an LLC lack business purpose and economic substance and are
disregarded for tax purposes);Nicole Rose Corp v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003) aff'g 117
T.C. 328 (2001) (court applied the two-part analysis to disallow ordinary business expense deductions
relating to leaseback and trust fund interests held for less than one day); FSA 200218022 (citing Nicole
Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, the Chief Counsel's Office applied section 482 to reallocate rental income,
rental deductions, and loss deductions claimed in several stripping transactions and transfers of stripped
leasehold interests).
7
Yoram Keinan, The Profit Requirement Under the Economic Substance Doctrine, 21 J. Tax'n Inv. 81
(2003).
8
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
9

ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) aff’g in part, ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999) ("In assessing the economic
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As early as 1935, in Gregory v. Halvering,10 the Supreme Court established the
requirement that tax motivated transactions must involve a business purpose to be given
effect. In this case, the taxpayer was the sole owner of a corporation. The corporation
owned securities with a built-in gain. To convert ordinary income on the securities into
capital gains, the taxpayer incorporated a new corporation and transferred the securities
to the new corporation. The old corporation distributed the stock of the new corporation,
and immediately after, the new corporation was liquidated. Finally, the securities were
sold. The taxpayer argued that the gain from the sale was capital gains.
The Second Circuit, and, subsequently, the Supreme Court, disagreed. In the Supreme
Court's own words:
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether,
and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually, occurred, what do
we find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose - a
mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise
for concealing its real character, and sole object and accomplishment of which
was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or
any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the
petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that
corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It
was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was
intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that
limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death. In these
circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but one
interpretation. The whole undertaking though conducted according to the
terms of (the statutory provision), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of
conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else.
The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not
pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the
plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious
purpose.11
In Higgins v. Smith,12 the Supreme Court further elaborated:
The Government urges that the principle underlying Gregory v. Helvering
finds expression in the rule calling for a realistic approach to tax situations. As
so broad and unchallenged a principle furnishes only a general direction, it is
of little value in the solution of tax problems. If, on the other hand, the
Gregory case is viewed as a precedent for the disregard of a transfer of assets
without a business purpose but solely to reduce tax liability, it gives support to
10
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the natural conclusion that transactions, which do not vary control or change
the flow of economic benefits, are to be dismissed from consideration. . . The
Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form
employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal
or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the
purposes of the tax statute.13
In Moline Properties v. United States,14 the sole shareholder of a corporation, attempted
to characterize gain from the sale of real property, title to which was held by the
corporation, as gain to the shareholder on the grounds that the existence of the
corporation was “merely fictitious” for federal income tax purposes.15 The Supreme
Court held that the taxpayer could not disregard the corporate form of his business
organization unless such form was a “sham or unreal,”16 setting forth a two-prong
disjunctive test in determining whether a separate corporate entity should be recognized:
(i) a subjective standard requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-tax
business purpose that is served by the selection of the corporate form , and (ii) an
objective standard requiring that the entity has engaged in sufficient business activity.
In Knetsch v. United States,17 the taxpayer purchased 30-years deferred annuity bonds
with a face amount of $4,000,000 bearing interest of 2.5 percent. The purchase price was
funded by a loan bearing interest of 3.5 percent. The Supreme Court observed that: “it is
patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction
beyond a tax deduction.”18 The court ruled against the taxpayer on the grounds that the
transaction had "no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain a tax
benefit."
In Goldstein v. Commissioner,19 the taxpayer borrowed $945,000 from two banks at 4
percent interest, and investing the proceeds in U.S. Treasury securities maturing in 3 or 4
years, with a face amount of $1,000,000, which paid interest of 1.5 percent. Similar to
Knetsch, the taxpayer in Goldstein had locked in an economic loss from the inception of
the transaction. The Court of Appeals rejected the Tax Court’s characterization of the
transactions as a “sham” transaction on the grounds that the transactions were made with
two different and independent banks, on a non-recourse basis. The court concluded,
therefore, that the transactions did, in fact, take place and therefore could not be ignored
as "shams." The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to
13
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disallow the deductions on the grounds that the taxpayer’s purpose in entering into the
transaction was solely to obtain tax benefits. The Circuit Court disallowed the interest
deduction claimed under Section 163 citing a lack of economic substance as well as a
lack of a non-tax business purpose as the reason for disallowance.
Twelve years later, in Frank Lyon v. United States, the Supreme Court was faced with a
sale-leaseback transaction. In this case, the taxpayer borrowed $7.1 million, bought a
building from a bank for $7.6 (the $7.1 million plus $0.5 million of the taxpayer’s own
funds), and leased the building back to a bank for rent equal to the taxpayer’s payments
of principal and interest on the 7.1 million loan. The term of the lease was 25 years, with
options to extend it up to 40 more years. The lease agreement also provided the taxpayer
with a fixed rate of return on its $ 0.5 million investment. At the end of the lease term,
the bank could either acquire the building or extend the lease. The taxpayer claimed
depreciation deductions from building and interest deductions on the loan, and reported
the payments from the bank as income from rent.
The IRS argued that the taxpayer acted as a conduit for mortgage payments and
disallowed depreciation and interest deductions. The taxpayer argued that it was a
separate entity and that the business purpose of the transaction was to overcome legal and
regulatory constraints to which the bank was subject.
The United States Supreme Court held for the taxpayer and held that the transaction was
not a sham The Supreme Court set forth the following standard to determine when a
transaction should be respected for tax purposes:
Where . . . there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation. 20
Frank Lyon established the two-prong test pursuant to which the economic substance test
comprised of two prongs: objective economic substance and subjective business purpose.
This standard is discussed in greater detail below.
In Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v. Commissioner,21 another case involving a lease
transaction, the taxpayer purchased a 70 percent interest in a six-year old IBM computer
for $1,455,227. The taxpayer paid the purchase price to a financing company with a
$250,000 recourse note, payable over three years, and two non-recourse notes, totaling
$1,205, 227, payable over eight years. The taxpayer leased the computer back to the
financing company for eight years, with rents calculated so that the pretax cash flows to
the taxpayer were $10,000 per year. In fact, the only amounts ever to change hands were
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the $10,000 annual payments, representing the excess of the taxpayer’s income over its
debt obligation.
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the two prong test established by the Supreme Court in
Frank Lyon as a disjunctive test. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that a transaction
will be treated as having no economic substance if "the taxpayer was motivated by no
business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that
the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit
exists.“22
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner23 was the first CINS transaction reviewed by the Tax
Court. Generally, a partnership between a U.S. and foreign partner was formed to
acquire non-readily-marketable property and sell it in exchange for a large fixed payment
plus small contingent payments. The resulting gain for the year of the sale was allocated
to the foreign partner, while the later years' corresponding losses would be allocated to
the U.S. partner. The transaction was specifically designed to accelerate gain for the
foreign partner and provide, through the partnership agreement, a distributive share of
most of the losses to the domestic partners in later tax years.
The Tax Court held that the transaction lacked economic substance and described the
economic substance doctrine as follows:
The tax law . . . requires that the intended transactions have economic
substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax
reduction. The doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a
judicial remedy is warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits,
unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic
purpose other than tax savings.24
Courts have observed, however, that the application of the economic substance and
similar doctrines is limited. In Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
Commissioner (“NIPSCO),25 similar to Aiken Industries, the taxpayer’s goal was to
obtain exemption under the treaty between the United States and the Netherlands Antilles
treaty. The taxpayer created a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary for the purpose of
obtaining funds. The subsidiary issued notes in the Eurobond market with a call option
guaranteed by NIPSCO, and NIPSCO received the proceeds in exchange for a $70
million note. The subsidiary earned income on the spread between the interest it received
from NIPSCO and the interest it paid to the holders of the notes. When NIPSCO paid off
the note, the subsidiary redeemed the notes for a premium in addition to principal and
interest paid to the holders of the notes. Subsequently, the subsidiary was liquidated.
22
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The IRS argued that the subsidiary was merely a conduit and should be disregarded The
Tax Court rejected the IRS’s argument and distinguished from Aiken on the grounds in
Aiken, the transaction had no business purpose, while in NIPSCO, the subsidiary had
legitimate business purpose, that is,to borrow money in Europe at a favorable rate and to
lend it to NIPSCO.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s decision, stating that:
Knetsch and the captive insurance company cases do not dictate the outcome the
Commissioner desires. Those cases allow the Commissioner to disregard transactions
which are designed to manipulate the Tax Code so as to create artificial tax
deductions. They do not allow the Commissioner to disregard economic transactions,
such as the transactions in this case, which result in actual, non-tax-related changes in
economic position.26
Similarly, as the District Court indicted in Coltec Industries, “if a taxpayer clearly
satisfies unambiguous statutory and/or regulatory requirements, courts may decline to
apply the economic substance doctrine.” 27 For example, the district Court stated that the
U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine in Nebraska Department of Revenue
v. Lowenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994), and stated that "whatever the language Frank Lyon
v. United States] . . . may mean, our decision in that case . . . was founded on an
examination . . . of 27 specific facts.").28
The IRS has also applied the doctrine in numerous rulings and other guidance. In
Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 29 the IRS described the fundamentals of the economic substance
26
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doctrine:
The courts have held that a loss is allowable as a deduction for federal income
tax purposes only if it is bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences.
An artificial loss lacking economic substance is not allowable.30
Since 2000, several legislative proposals have been made to codify or clarify the
economic substance doctrine into the Internal Revenue Code. As of today, none of these
proposals have been enacted. The most recent version has not been included in the Jobs
Act of 2004, which was signed into law by the president in October 22, 2004. These
proposals are discussed in greater detail below
II.

The Economic Substance Doctrine
A.

General

Under the general application of the judicial economic substance doctrine, the tax
benefits of transactions lacking such attributes may be denied.31 "An activity will not
provide the basis for deductions if it lacks economic substance."32 A transaction that
would otherwise result in beneficial tax treatment to a taxpayer will be disregarded if the
transaction lacks economic substance.33 Nevertheless, as numerous courts have
indicated, taxpayers are generally free to structure their affairs so as to minimize their tax
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liability; therefore, a transaction does not lack economic substance merely because it is
tax motivated.34
A finding that a transaction lacks economic substance will result in disallowance of any
tax benefits from the transaction. As the Tax Court specified in Glass v. Commissioner:
In conclusion, we hold that the London Option Transaction--petitioners'
multiple and complex tax straddle scheme encompassing prearranged results-lacked economic substance and was a sham. Petitioners consequently may not
deduct the losses claimed by them in Year One of their straddle transactions. It
follows, of course, that since the straddle transactions were a sham, gains
reported by petitioners in Year Two and thereafter do not constitute taxable
income to them, and we so hold.35
In determining whether a certain benefit ought to be disallowed, “[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether the transaction that generated the claimed deductions. . had economic
substance.” (emphasis added)36 Thus, a taxpayer may not combine a valid transaction
with the disputed transaction to assert that the overall position had economic substance. 37
Frank Lyon has been construed to establish a two-prong standard for examining if a
transaction lacks economic substance. Under the general two-prong test described in
greater detail below, the economic substance doctrine is based on an objective and
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subjective determination of whether a transaction has real, nontax economic benefit.38
Courts have applied various tests to evaluate whether a transaction lacks such nontax
economic benefits. For example, several courts have compared the disputed transaction
with transactions that might normally be expected to occur in bona fide business
settings.39 Other courts have applied a cost v. potential profit to determine the existence
or lack of substance.40 A minority of courts have applied the opportunity costs analysis
pursuant to which a transaction is deemed to have no business purpose if the taxpayer
could have earned the same benefit without the disputed complex structure.41
Generally, the taxpayer carries the burden of proof to show she has not been acting to
avoid taxes.42 Courts have found a business purpose in several cases even though the
taxpayer may have been primarily or predominantly motivated by tax benefits. Under
this approach, a transaction lacks a business purpose only if the taxpayer’s sole
motivation is tax avoidance.43 As the Eleventh Circuit indicated in UPS, “no-businesspurpose cases concern tax-shelter transactions or investments by a business or investor
38
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792 (4th Cir. 1989) (“ this prong [business purpose] requires a showing that the only purpose for entering
into the transaction was the tax consequences.”) Pacific Gamble Robinson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M.
915, 927 (1987);Ockels v. Commissioner, 54 TCM 785, 796 (1987); UPS Of America v. Commissioner, 254
F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A "business purpose" does not mean a reason for a transaction that is
free of tax considerations. “)

that would not have occurred, in any form, but for tax-avoidance reasons.” (Emphasize in
original).44
B.

The Two-Prong Test
1.

Overview

Numerous courts have expressed the view that the inquiry into whether the taxpayer’s
transaction has sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on
two related factors, the “objective economic substance of the transaction” and the
“subjective business motivation” behind it.45 The same principle was recently stated by
the Senate report in the Jobs Act of 2004. This standard will be referred to herein as the
“two-prong” test. The business purposestandard focuses on the motives of the taxpayer
for entering into the transaction, while the economic substance standard involves an
objective analysis of the taxpayer’s economic position before and after the transaction.46
As set forth below, several variations have emerged for each prong.
In addition, several courts have incorporated the substance-over-form doctrine as a
third prong of the economic substance doctrine. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Bail
Bonds v. Commissioner:
The business purpose factor often involves an examination of the subjective
factors which motivated a taxpayer to make the transaction at issue. The
economic substance factor involves a broader examination of whether the
substance of a transaction reflects its form, and whether from an objective
standpoint the transaction was likely to produce economic benefits aside from
a tax deduction.47
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,48 the Supreme Court held that a transaction will be
recognized for tax purposes only if it has "economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless
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UPS, at 1020, citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) aff’g in part,
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999), Karr v.
Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991), Kirchman and Rice's Toyota World, Inc v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
45

See ACM Partnership, 157 F.3d at 247 (citing decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 113 T.C. at 280, 285 (also citing decisions by the Courts of
Appeals for the Third, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits).
46
See Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354 (“The application of the ‘business purpose’ prong is a subjective test,
whereas the application of the ‘economic substance’ prong is an objective test.”).
47
Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The analysis of whether a transaction is
a substantive sham, however, addresses whether a transaction's substance is that which its form
represents.”)
48
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, at 583-84.

labels attached . . ."49 Frank Lyon has been construed to create the two-prong test for
determining whether a transaction is a "sham" to be disregarded for tax purposes entirely:
"(1) has the taxpayer shown that it has a business purpose for engaging in the transaction
other than tax avoidance? (2) has the taxpayer shown that the transaction had economic
substance beyond the creation of tax benefits?"50
Frank Lyon has been interpreted differently in almost every circuit. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner51 has interpreted the twoprong inquiry set forth in Frank Lyon as follows: a tax-favored transaction may be
treated as an economic sham and tax benefits would be denied where (i) the taxpayer has
no business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits and (ii) the transaction lacks
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a pre-tax profit exists.52
While in Rice’s Toyota53 the Fourth Circuit has treated economic substance and business
purpose as two prongs of a disjunctive test, a position adopted by other circuits, as
discussed below, other courts have applied a conjunctive test pursuant to which the
taxpayer must satisfy both prongs to be eligible for the tax benefits. Finally, several
circuits have held that the objective and subjective prongs are related factors “both of
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from
its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”54
2.

Conjunctive/Disjunctive/Unitary

Circuits are divided on how to apply the two-prong test.55 Some circuits have required
that a transaction will satisfy both the economic substance and business purpose (i.e., a
conjunctive test) standards to validate a transaction.56 Other circuits have determined,
49

Id. See also United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d at 122, and cases cited; Peerless Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 94-1 USTC ¶ 50,043 at 83,171 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d in an unpublished opinion, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d
Cir. 1994); Seykota v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2706, 2721 and 2726 (1991).
50
See also Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Rasmussen v. Commissioner,
63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2710 (1992); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 154849 (9th Cir. 1987).
51
752 F.2d at, 91-95.
52
See also Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-97, at 88-89 (“A transaction may be
treated as a sham where (1) the taxpayer is motivated by no business purpose other than obtaining tax
benefits, and (2) the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit
exists.”) Citing Rice’s Toyota. Cf. Shriver v. Commissioner, (“we do not read Frank Lyon to say anything
that mandates a two-part analysis. And although Rice's Toyota World seems to conclude a two-part test is
consistent with Frank Lyon, the Fourth Circuit opinion does not appear to hold that such a test is essential..
. . We find no rigidity or inflexibility in either Frank Lyon or Rice's Toyota World.”)
53
752 F.2d at 91.
54
ACM Partnership, 157 F.3d at 247 (citing decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits); Winn Dixie, 113 T.C. at 42 (citing decisions in the Eleventh Circuit)
55
See Senate Report on the JOBS Act of 2004, citing Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“The casebooks are glutted with [economic substance] tests. Many such tests proliferate
because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and precision. They often obscure rather than
clarify.”)
56
See Senate Report, citing as an example Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993).
See also Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229, 1252, n13: (“The presence of business purpose does not

however, that the existence of either economic substance or business purpose (i.e.,
disjunctive test) would validate a transaction.57 In addition, some courts have given more
weight to one prong than the other and in several cases, focused primarily on one prong
and disregarded the other. For example, in applying the two-prong test, several courts
have focused primarily on the objective prong in determining the validity of a transaction,
and gave no, or minimal weight to the subjective prong.58 Other courts, however, have
focused on the subjective intent of the taxpayer, frequently applying a profit motive test
similar to that under section 183, as discussed herein.59

In addition, some courts have applied a more flexible test, generally referred to as the
“unitary analysis” pursuant to which economic substance and business purpose are
“simply more precise factors to consider” in determining whether a transaction has any
practical economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits.60 Finally, courts are
entitle a transaction to be recognized for Federal tax purposes where objective indicia of economic
substance indicating a realistic potential for economic profit are not manifest.”) See also Torres v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702, 719 (1987) (“a finding of lack of economic substance is inappropriate if either
a business purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit apart from expected tax benefits is found to have
been present.”)
57
See Senate Report for the JOBS Act of 2004, citing Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89,
91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) (“To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated
by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and, second, that the
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.”); IES Industries
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001) (“In determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax
purposes [under the Eighth Circuit test], a transaction will be characterized as a sham if it is not motivated
by any economic purpose out of tax considerations (the business purpose test), and if it is without economic
substance because no real potential for profit exists” (the economic substance test).”). See also Sanderson
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1985-477 (“This Court has interpreted this language to mean that, to uphold
the validity of a sale-leaseback transaction, the transaction must either satisfy a subjective "business
purpose" test, or satisfy an objective ‘economic substance’ test.”). As recently stated by a District Court
residing in the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s standard, as stated in Rice’s Toyota, is the disjunctive
test. See Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 at 6 (N.D.
Md. Oct. 22, 2004).
58
Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“It is clear that transactions whose
sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer.).
Cf. Karr, 924 F.2d at 1023 (noting that subjective intent is not irrelevant, despite Kirchman's statement of
the doctrine.). In, Rose, the Tax Court held that the proper test to determine economic substance is whether
the transaction has any practicable effects other than the creation of income tax losses. Accordingly, under
this standard, a transaction that has a business purpose or profit objective will survive the Rose [the proper
test is "whether the transaction has any practicable effects other than the creation of income tax losses."
59
Smith v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 733 (1988).
60

See Senate Report for the JOBS Act of 2004, citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231,
247 (3d Cir. 1998), aff’g in part & rev’g in part 73 TCM 2189 (1997) (“[The objective and subjective]
distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step
analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction
had sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”). James v.
Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1990), aff’g 87 T.C. 905 (1986) and Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d
982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply
more precise factors to consider .... We have repeatedly and carefully noted that this formulation cannot be
used as a ‘rigid two-step analysis’.”); Thompson v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). See also Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, 2004 WL 1924931 (D.

divided on what each prong means; although it is clear that one is objective and the other
subjective, several variations have emerged for each prong. Regardless of whether the
rigid two-prong or the unitary test is applied, however, most courts agree that the
objective economic substance and subjective business purposes are two different
standards.61
In 1972, six years before Frank Lyon, the Ninth Circuit presented in Brooke v. United
States,62 some of these competing views regarding the application of the two-prong test.
The court first discussed the Government’s view of the test as a conjunctive test:
The Government adamantly asserts that this transfer lacks a business purpose,
which therefore disqualifies it for a business deduction. Several leading cases
employ such language.63
The court went on and presented the view that only the objective test is relevant:
Other cases require only that the transfer be grounded in substantial economic
reality.64
Finally, the court concluded that the conjunctive test ought to apply:
[A] transfer solely to avoid taxes will not be recognized.65
The Objective Prong
We first turn into the question what is the objective standard. In general, there are
several views regarding the application of the objective prong of the economic substance
test. As the Third Circuit recently summarized in CM Holding:

Conn. Aug. 27, 2004); Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) affg.
Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968 (1985); see also Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 147-148 (2d
Cir. 1991), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-205; Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990), affg.
in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1988-341
61
Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986, 993 (“The economic substance of a business transaction and the
intent, purpose, or motive of an individual investor, while sometimes equated, are not identical.”). Cf
Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984) (“There is no real difference between the
business purpose and the economic substance rules. Both simply state that the Commissioner may look
beyond the form of an action to discover its substance.")
62
468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972).
63 Citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935); Van Zandt v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 341 F.2d 440, 443-444 (5th Cir. 1965); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Transport Trading & Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949).
64 Citing Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). Cf. Gilbert v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957). According to the court, Alden B.
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), expressly eschews the "business purpose" test. See also, Skemp v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956).
65 Citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935); Audano v. United
States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).

There are several different formulations of the objective portion of the
economic substance inquiry. Knetsch voided a transaction because it "did not
appreciably affect [the taxpayer's] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax."
364 U.S. at 366 (internal citations omitted). In United States v. Wexler we
held that “where a transaction has no substance other than to create
deductions, the transaction is disregarded for tax purposes." 31 F.3d 117, 122
(3d Cir. 1994). In ACM Partnership we required a "net economic effect on
the taxpayer's economic position." 157 F.3d at 249. The main question these
different formulations address is a simple one: absent the tax benefits, whether
the transaction affected the taxpayer's financial position in any way.
Under the broadest view, courts focus on the taxpayer’s economic position before and
after the disputed transaction and require that the taxpayer’s position be changed in order
to satisfy the objective prong. Under this approach, economic substance is determined by
an objective evaluation of the changes in the taxpayer’s economic position, aside from
tax benefits.66 As summarized by the Tax Court, “[e]conomic substance . . . is
determined by objective evaluation of changes in economic position of the taxpayer
(economic effects) aside from tax benefits.”67 The Senate Report of the JOBS Act of
2004 stated differently:”[the economic substance] doctrine denies tax benefits arising
from transactions that do not result in a meaningful change to the taxpayer’s economic
position other than a purported reduction in federal income tax.”.68 In Long Term Capital
Holding v. United States, the taxpayer argued that the objective test ought to be whether
the transaction has changed the economic positions/rights of the parties other than tax
savings. The District Court, however, rejected this standard and applied the cost v.
reasonably expected standard discussed below. Finally, recent proposals to codify the
economic substance doctrine supported this broader view. Specifically, a transaction
would be viewed as satisfying the objective prong of the economic substance doctrine if
the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax effects) the
taxpayer’s economic position.69

A narrower view would focus on the taxpayer’s expected benefits from the transaction.70
In other words, under this approach, not only the taxpayer’s position must change, it
must be a change providing a benefit to the taxpayer. For example, sometimes a
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Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 113 T.C. at 280, 285. Cf. Long Term Capital Holding v. United States 2004 WL
1924931 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), rejecting this test and applying the cost v. reasonably expected profit
instead.
67
Winn Dixie, 113 T.C. at 284.
68
Johnson v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 709 , 716-717 (1995).
69

See proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (II).

70

Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987).

taxpayer derives a profit from the form of entity, from incorporation (limited liability),
accounting benefits and other benefits not specifically translated into “profit.”71
Finally, the narrowest view would focus on the taxpayer’s reasonably-expected profits
from the transaction.72 In contrast to the previous views, this approach would require a
quantification of benefits in the form of an economic profit. Thus, this standard is
narrower than the previous ones, because a meaningful change in the taxpayer’s
economic positions will include potential profit, but may also include other elements that
are not reflected in the profit potential test.
In Long Term Capital Holding v United States73, the District Court applied a cost v.
reasonably expected profit formula to conclude that the disputed transaction had no
objective economic substance.74 The Federal Court of Claims expanded the definition
and held that “[t]he determination of whether a transaction has economic substance is
essentially a two part analysis: (1) whether the substance of the transaction is reflected in
its form, and (2) whether the transaction had a reasonable objective possibility of
providing a profit aside from tax benefits.” The court emphasized that this standard
requires that the taxpayer act as a “prudent investor” in determining whether to enter into
the disputed transaction to satisfy the objective prong. A similar view was earlier
expressed by the Second Circuit in Gilman v. Commissioner,75 where the Second Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's economic substance analysis, which was approached from "the
standpoint of a prudent investor."76
To conclude, the objective standard can either take the form of a narrow cost v. potential
profit analysis, a broader potential benefit standard, or a, even broader test of evaluating
changes in the taxpayer’s position before and after the transaction. Satisfying the profit
potential standard would, therefore, satisfy the objective prong.
The Subjective Prong
As set forth above, the inquiry into whether there was a legitimate business purpose for a
transaction involves a subjective analysis of the taxpayer’s intent.77 To satisfy this prong,
71

For example, in TIFD, the taxpayer claimed other benefits, such as to raise capital and to demonstrate to
investors, rating agencies, and its senior management, that it could raise capital.
72
For a comprehensive discussion on what constitutes adequate profit potential, see Yoram Keinan, the
Profit Motive under the Economic Substance Doctrine. A discussion on the amount of profit required to
satisfy this standard is beyond the scope of this article.
73

2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).

74

See also Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986, 993 (“A business transaction by its very nature must have
economic substance, that is, a realistic potential for profit.”) citing James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905
(10th Cir. 1990), aff’g 87 T.C. 905 (1986).
75
Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir, 1991).
76
77

See Long Term Capital Holding, citing Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d at 147.

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. at 278, aff’d, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Lee v.
Commissioner, 155 F.3d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994);

the taxpayer must demonstrate a nontax purpose to satisfy the subjective prong. Some
courts have held that the taxpayer's business purpose must be primary, i.e., of greater
importance than tax benefits.78
Generally, subjective intent may be demonstrated by the existence of an objective pre-tax
profit potential expected at the time the transactions were entered into and other business
and regulatory considerations.79 Some courts even stated the subjective prong “is similar
to the ‘primarily for profit’ standard of §§ 165 and 108.”80 Nevertheless, the fact that the
principal (but not the only) purpose of a transaction is to obtain a favorable tax treatment
is not a reason for disallowing such favorable treatment.81 For example, in UPS, the
Seventh Circuit held that:
[a] ‘business purpose’ does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of
tax considerations. Rather, a transaction has a ‘business purpose,’ when we
are talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it figures in a bona fide,
profit-seeking business.82
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit established in Boca Investerings and ASA Investerings that
while taxpayers are allowed to structure their business transactions in such a way as to
minimize their tax, these transactions must have a legitimate non-tax avoidance business
purpose to be recognized as legitimate for tax purposes.83
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-115, aff’d. in part, rev’d. in part, dismissed in part,
157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
78
Ramsay v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 793, 810 (1984); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210, 232-33 (1983)
Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982), aff’d 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984).
79
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d at 134-35. See also TIEF (“In evaluating the economic
substance of a transaction, courts are cautioned to give more weight to objective facts than self- serving
testimony.”) Citing. Lee v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1998); Shriver v. Commissioner, 899
F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The business purpose inquiry examines whether the taxpayer was induced
to commit capital for reasons only relating to tax considerations or whether a non-tax motive, or legitimate
profit motive, was involved.”)
80
Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989).
81

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 (1978); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734,
741 (2d Cir. 1966) (a tax benefit should be permitted whenever it can be said that the taxpayer’s desire to
secure such benefit “is only one of mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer,” while a tax benefit should be
denied where the transaction “has no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer’s desire to obtain the tax
benefit”). See also Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (“taxavoidance motive is not inherently fatal to a transaction. A taxpayer has a legal right to conduct his
business so as to decrease (or altogether avoid) the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes.”), citing
Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988). ("There is no rule against taking advantage of
opportunities created by Congress or the Treasury Department for beating taxes."); Aiken Industries, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1. ("The fact that the actions taken by the
parties in this case were taken to minimize their tax burden may not by itself be utilized to deny a benefit to
which the parties are otherwise entitled under the convention."); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595, 600
(1968) ("[A] taxpayer may adopt any form he desires for the conduct of his business, and . . . the chosen
form cannot be ignored merely because it results in a tax saving.").
82
UPS, at 1019.
83

Boca Investerings v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2003), citing ASA Investerings 201 F.3d
at 513.

As noted in ASA Investerings:
A tax system of rather high rates gives a multitude of clever individuals in the
private sector powerful incentives to game the system. Even the smartest
drafters of legislation and regulation cannot be expected to anticipate every
device. The business purpose doctrine reduces the incentive to engage in such
essentially wasteful activity, and in addition helps achieve reasonable equity
among taxpayers who are similarly situated--in every respect except for
differing investments in tax avoidance.84
In Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, the court added another factor to the
business purpose analysis - -the “reasonable means” factor. The court observed that
“[t]aking fee-generating investments was Long Term’s core business and was regularly
executed without either complex machinations related to OTC’s contributions or the
attendant millions in transaction costs.”85 Thus, a court can disregard a nontax business
purpose if the taxpayer could have achieved the same result by entering into a more
simple transaction, which is consistent with the taxpayer’s core business.
In the Circuits in which the disjunctive standard is applied, even if the sole business
purpose was to achieve tax benefits, the transaction may still be validated if it has
economic substance.86 In some cases, the objective economic substance may be
dispositive if the amount of economic substance is significant enough.87
As described in greater detail below, courts frequently focus on the profit motive of the
taxpayer in applying the subjective test. “The ‘business purpose’ test involves the
consideration whether a taxpayer had an ‘actual and honest profit objective’ in engaging
in the transactions at issue.”88 Thus, many taxpayers have attempted to prove that they
entered into the disputed transaction to make a profit, in order to satisfy this prong.89 In
other cases, such as TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,90 however, the court found that the
transaction had a legitimate business purpose, accepting the taxpayer’s argument that it
entered into the partnership agreement to raise capital and, more importantly, to

84
85
86

Id.
Citing Boca Investerings P’ship, 314 F.3d at 631-32.

In Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. Oct.
22, 2004), the parties stipulated that there was no business purpose, but the court still upheld the transaction
onthe grounds that it had economic substance.
87
Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-359 (“[A] transaction imbued with economic
substance normally will be recognized for tax purposes even in the absence of a nontax business purpose”);
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (economic
substance doctrine “do[es] not allow the Commissioner to disregard economic transactions . . . which result
in actual, non-tax-related changes in economic position”).
88
Coffey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-516.
89
See, for example, IES and Compaq, in which the taxpayer’s arguments focused on the profit potential
from the transactions.

demonstrate to investors, rating agencies, and its senior management, that it could raise
capital.
3.

The Conjunctive Test

Under the conjunctive standard, if a court finds the lack of either of the prongs, it,
presumably, is not required to examine the other prong, and may invalidate the
transaction.91 In other words, a taxpayer is required to establish the presence of both
prongs for the transaction to withstand court scrutiny.
The conjunctive test has certain variations. The basic principle is that a transaction must
satisfy both standards, objective and subjective; nevertheless, some courts give more
weight to one prong over the other, while others will treat them equally. While some
courts begin with the subjective prong (usually by evaluating the profit motive) other
courts have first tested the objective standard and if it were found that the transaction
lacked economic substance, the court would stop and invalidate the transaction.92 As the
Seventh Circuit indicated in UPS, “[e]ven if the transaction has economic effects, it must
be disregarded if it has no business purpose and its motive is tax avoidance.”93
Under the conjunctive test, if the court begins with the objective prong and finds that the
transaction had economic substance, it will next examine if the transaction had business
purpose.94 On the other hand, if the court finds that the transaction lacked objective
economic substance, it is not required to examine whether the taxpayer had business
purpose. In Ferguson v. Commissioner,95 the court held that:
Having concluded that the partnerships' Koppelman Process activities lacked
economic substance, those activities must be disregarded for tax purposes and
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No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988) (the economic substance of a transaction can be
established if the transaction had objective economic substance and there was a subjective non-tax business
purpose.)
91

92

Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The analysis of whether a transaction
is a substantive sham, however, addresses whether a transaction's substance is that which its form
represents. That does not necessarily require an analysis of a taxpayer's subjective intent. Once a court
determines a transaction is a sham, no further inquiry into intent is necessary.”) ;Lee v. Commissioner, 155
F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1998), citing ,Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir 1990); Gilman
v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148, n. 5 (2d Cir. 1991) (“section 183 applies after a transaction has been
determined to have economic substance.”) cert. denied, 116 L.Ed. 2d 776, 112 S. Ct. 871 (1992); Mahoney
v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 (“Here, the Tax Court in a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion
decided the transactions were a sham, thus making it unnecessary to directly reach the "entered for profit
issue.")
93
UPS of America v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2001).
94

Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The threshold question is whether the
transaction has economic substance. If the answer is yes, the question becomes whether the taxpayer was
motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.")
95
29 F.3d 98, 102 (1994),

cannot form the basis of any deductions. It is unnecessary, therefore, for us to
analyze the tax court's findings with respect to the partnerships' profit motive.
Other courts applying the conjunctive test have begun with the subjective prong.
Because the taxpayer must prove both prongs to prevail, showing an honest nontax
business purpose would not suffice under this standard. As the Tax Court indicated in
Cherin:
Subjective intent cannot supply economic substance to a business transaction.
Where, as in the case at bar, we examine the transaction and conclude as we
do in this case that Southern Star's herd investment packages lack any realistic
potential for profit, we need not examine the investor's state of mind.96
The Tax Court in Sheldon97 and ACM Partnership98 also started with the subjective
standard, which was basically, a profit motive test. In both of these cases, the Tax Court
considered the profit potential to be probative of the taxpayer’s motivation. Because the
courts found the potential for profit to be insignificant, the Tax Court concluded that the
taxpayer was motivated solely by tax benefits. In general, if the court applies the
conjunctive test, begins with the-profit potential standard, and finds it to be no more than
de-minims, the court can stop and hold that the transaction should be invalidated and tax
benefits be denied. Nevertheless, in these two cases as well as in many others, the courts
went on to perform the objective analysis.
As set forth in greater detail below, all recent legislative proposals to codify the economic
substance doctrine specifically would apply the conjunctive test. Specifically, pursuant
to the most recent proposal (which was not enacted into law), a transaction has economic
substance only if (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax
effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax
purpose for entering into such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable means of
accomplishing such purpose.99
To conclude, as a practical matter, the conjunctive test works similarly to the unitary test
described below. Under both standards, a court would, generally, not validate a
transaction unless the taxpayer satisfies both prongs in one way or the other. In addition,
courts applying the conjunctive or unitary test give more weight to the objective analysis,
and in some cases, as discussed in the next section, completely disregard the subjective
prong.
4.
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Cherin, at 99496 See Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) ("It is clear that
transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the
motive of the taxpayer.")
97
Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990).
98
73 T.C.M 2189 (1997), aff’d, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
99
See proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (II).

In several cases, the economic substance objective prong has been the sole basis for the
courts in disregarding the form of the transaction where the taxpayer's only claimed
business purpose was to earn a profit. Some courts completely disregarded the subjective
standard and focused primarily on the objective standard. The rationale behind this
standard is that if the claimed business purpose of the taxpayer is to earn a profit by
entering into the transaction, unlike the transaction in Frank Lyon which was also guided
by accounting and regulatory concerns, the two prongs of the test overlap to a large
extent.
A similar view was expressed by both Treasury and the Joint Committee of Taxation in
1999, in their lengthy reports on tax shelters. Treasury suggested that
[a] tax avoidance transaction would be defined as any transaction in which the
reasonably expected pre-tax profit (determined on a present value basis, after
taking into account foreign taxes as expenses and transaction costs) of the
transaction are insignificant relative to the reasonably expected net tax
benefits (i.e., tax benefits in excess of the tax liability arising from the
transaction, determined on a present value basis) of such transaction. In
addition, a tax avoidance transaction would be defined to cover transactions
involving the improper elimination or significant reduction of tax on
economic income.100
This definition resembles the test applied by the IRS in Notice 98-5.101 In both Notice 985 and the Treasury’s proposed definition, the subjective motives of the taxpayer are not
taken into account. Rather, the motives of the taxpayer are analyzed objectively based on
whether the taxpayer reasonably expects an economic profit from the transaction in
question. Thus,Treasury decided against adopting a subjective test and in favor of the
objective leg of the economic substance doctrine. The rationale behind Treasury's
proposal was that a subjective test would likely prove inadequate for the following
reasons. First, the Treasury argued that corporations exist to make a profit and therefore,
will be presumed to satisfy the potential for profit test even if its expectation of profit is
unreasonable. Second, permitting corporate taxpayers to enter into transactions with
unreasonable expectations of profit would permit corporations to engage in transactions
solely for tax benefits.102
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According to the Joint Committee, a transaction will not be recognized for tax purposes if
“[t]he reasonably expected pretax profit from the arrangement is insignificant relative to
the reasonably expected tax benefits."103
As discussed above, subjective intent is frequently demonstrated by the existence of an
objective pre-tax profit potential expected at the time the transactions were entered into
and other business and regulatory considerations. Thus, as a practical matter, the court
applies objective analysis under both prongs.
As the Second Circuit indicated in Rosenfeld v. Commissioner:104
[W]e decline appellant's invitation to adopt a business purpose standard of
review. Rather, we believe our inquiry should focus on whether there has
been a change in the economic interests of the relevant parties. If their legal
rights and beneficial interests have changed, there is no basis for labeling a
transaction a "sham" and ignoring it for tax purposes. Indeed, our prior
decisions have indicated that this is the relevant inquiry.
In Carlson v. Commissioner, a case involving a purchase of a cable television system, the
Tax Court elaborated and stated that:
[W]e are not unaware of the proposition that where a taxpayer mistakenly
believes there existed a potential for profit, a transaction devoid of economic
substance may not be disregarded entirely (sometimes called the subjective
business purpose test). See Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comr., 81 T.C. at 203
n. 17. Under the circumstances of this case, however, [the taxpayer] should
have known that the transaction at issue could not achieve a non-tax profit. . . .
We refuse to allow a sophisticated businessman who has not taken adequate
steps to form a reasoned assessment of an investment to rely on his failure to
take such steps and on his resulting ignorance. . . . To do so would encourage
"tax shelter charlatans," and discourage taxpayers from independently
evaluating transactions and making informed business judgments, thereby
putting a premium on gullibility.105
This standard of review may be viewed as a part of the disjunctive test, because the
existence of one prong, namely the objective prong, would validate a transaction. Even
though, technically, the disjunctive test discussed in the next section would allow a
taxpayer to demonstrate either economic substance or business purpose, as a practical
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matter, most taxpayers would focus on showing objective substance under the disjunctive
test.106
5.

Disjunctive Test

A standard applied by some Circuits (primarily by the D.C., Federal and Fourth Circuits,
and occasionally by the Eighth Circuit) and several Tax Courts is a disjunctive test
pursuant to which the economic substance doctrine will disallow a tax benefit only after a
decision that the transaction lacked both a business purpose and economic substance (i.e.,
the existence of either a business purpose or economic substance would be sufficient to
respect the transaction).107 The leading case cited for this proposition is Rice’s Toyota.108
Generally, in the Fourth Circuit, a transaction will be treated as a sham (or having no
economic substance) if the court finds "that the taxpayer was motivated by no business
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit exists.
.109
As the Fourth Circuit elaborated:
The purpose of this test is to ascertain both the subjective motivations of the
taxpayer and the objective reasonableness of the investment to determine
whether the transaction contained economic substance aside from the tax
benefits.110
Five years later, in Hines v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit followed this standard and
held that:

106
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Under the test in Rice's Toyota, however, a transaction with an expected loss
may not be a sham if the taxpayer was motivated by some legitimate business
reason other than to obtain tax benefits. 111
Citing Faulconer v. Commissioner,112 the Fourth Circuit implied that the subjective prong
is tested on an objective basis, so there is some overlap between both prongs:
[T]he ultimate determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit is
to be made . . . by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of
the facts and circumstances of each case. A taxpayer's mere statement of
intent is given less weight than objective facts.
The Fourth Circuit, however, asserted that “[t]he mere assertion of such a belief,
particularly in the face of strong objective evidence that the taxpayer would incur a loss,
cannot by itself establish that the transaction was not a sham.” 113
Thus, the Fourth Circuit implied that a mere subjective belief that a transaction can
generate nontax profit may not suffice. This assertion may be viewed as inconsistent
with the court’s decision in Black & Decker v. United States114 where it was stipulated
from the beginning that there was no business purpose, but the court held for the taxpayer
on the grounds that the transaction had objective economic substance.
In Black & Decker v. United States,115 the District Court (in the Fourth Circuit) followed
the Fourth Circuit’s disjunctive standard. “The court may not ignore a transaction that
has economic substance, even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.”
Accordingly, the BDHMI transaction cannot be disregarded as a sham.” Thus, for
purposes of its motion for summary judgment, Black & Decker conceded that tax evasion
was its sole motivation, and focused on establishing objective economic substance.
The District Court applied a combination of the Moline Properties doctrine (see below)
and objective economic substance analysis to conclude that a corporation and its
transactions are objectively valid, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the
corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business transactions.116
111
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The Court looked at the facts and noted:
that [the subsidiary] (1) "assumed the responsibility for the management,
servicing, and administration of plaintiff's employee and retiree health
plans;" [footnote omitted] (2) has considered and proposed numerous
healthcare cost containment strategies since its inception in 1998, many of
which have been implemented by B & D; [footnote omitted] and (3) has
always maintained salaried employees. [footnote omitted]. Moreover, as a
result of the BDHMI transaction, BDHMI became responsible for paying
the healthcare claims of B & D employees, and such claims are paid with
BDHMI assets.
As a result, the court held that “[t]he BDHMI transaction, therefore, had very real
economic implications for every beneficiary of B & D's employee benefits program, as
well as for the parties to the transaction.” Applying the disjunctive test, therefore, the
court held for the taxpayer.117
In general, the D.C. Circuit has also adopted the disjunctive standard. In Horn v.
Commissioner,118 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that to treat a transaction
as a sham, the court must find that (i) the taxpayer was motivated by no business purpose
other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and (ii) that the transaction
has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit exists. The court
cited United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co.,119 where the Court found that two types of
reinsurance arrangements were not shams because they "served [other] valid and
substantial nontax purposes," specifically, risk allocation.120 . . . a transaction will not be
considered a sham if it is undertaken for profit or for other legitimate nontax business
purposes.”121 Thus, the court held that establishing that the transaction was undertaken
117
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for profit (presumably under the objective prong) or any legitimate nontax business
purpose (under the subjective prong) will validate the transaction.
In Boca Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner122 the Federal District Court followed
Horn, applied a disjunctive test and held that the test should a disjunctive test. The court
stated that "A transaction is not a sham and will be recognized for tax purposes if the
taxpayer satisfies either part of the test for economic substance - if either (1) using a
subjective analysis, the transaction has a non-tax business purpose, or (2) using an
objective analysis, the transaction has a reasonable possibility of generating a profit, exante."123 Although this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the repeal was not based on the standard applied by the District Court but rather
on the grounds that in the view of the Court of Appeals, the disputed transaction had
neither business purpose nor economic substance.124
In Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner,125 in evaluating the economic substance of the sale
leaseback transactions, the Tax Court also followed Horn and concluded that: “the saleleaseback should not be respected for tax purposes because (1) no reasonable possibility
for profit existed, and (2) RD Leasing was not motivated by any business purpose other
than obtaining tax benefits.126 Note that the Tax Court applied a separate analysis with
respect to the validity of the partnership, as discussed in greater detail below. The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed only the decision with respect to the validity of
the partnership, and did not conduct a separate economic substance analysis with respect
to the sale-leaseback transactions.127
In Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States,128 the U.S. Federal Court of Claims has also
indicated that the economic substance test is disjunctive:
In any event, the court already has considered and held that Coltec satisfied
the tax avoidance and business purpose tests in Section 357(b), therefore, ipso
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facto, the ‘economic substance’ doctrine is satisfied, since that doctrine
requires proof of at least one of these tests.129
Frequently, other circuits have applied the disjunctive test even though it may not be the
prevailing standard in the circuit. For example, in Shriver v. Commissioner, the Eighth
Circuit followed Rice’s Toyota and applied the disjunctive test:
For the reasons set out above, we determine that the tax court found both a lack of
business purpose and a lack of economic substance, thereby performing the
necessary analysis to determine that the transaction was actually a sham under
Rice's Toyota World.130
The Eighth Circuit, however, also asserted in Shriver that “we do not read Frank Lyon to
say anything that mandates a two-part analysis. And although Rice's Toyota World seems
to conclude a two-part test is consistent with Frank Lyon, the Fourth Circuit opinion does
not appear to hold that such a test is essential.” 131
The court, therefore, applied in addition the unitary analysis discussed below.
Subsequently, in IES, the Eighth Circuit did exactly the same. First, it stated the general
rule that
[i]n determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax purposes, the Eighth
Circuit has applied a two-part test set forth in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985), which the Fourth Circuit
ostensibly found in the Supreme Court's opinion in Frank Lyon Co. See Shriver v.
Comm’r, 899 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1990). Applying that test, a transaction
will be characterized as a sham if ‘it is not motivated by any economic purpose
outside of tax considerations" (the business purpose test), and if it "is without
economic substance because no real potential for profit exists’ (the economic
substance test).
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged, again, that it does not need to apply the
disjunctive test:
[t]he Shriver Court analyzed the transaction at issue in that case under both
parts of the test, but then said in dictum, "We do not read Frank Lyon to say
anything that mandates a two-part analysis." Id. at 727. The Court suggested
that a failure to demonstrate either economic substance or business purpose -both not required -- would result in the conclusion that the transaction in
129
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question was a sham for tax purposes. As in Shriver, we do not decide
whether the Rice's Toyota World test requires a two-part analysis because we
conclude that the ADR trades here had both economic substance and business
purpose.132
Thus, it is unclear what standard is prevalent in the Eighth Circuit. Similarly, it is unclear
what standard is applied by the Second Circuit. While the court in Long Term Capital
Holding v. United States133 asserted that the Second Circuit applies the unitary test, the
taxpayer in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,134 however, urged the court to apply the
disjunctive test, and the court implied that the disjunctive test may also be applicable in
the Second Circuit (although the court held that it does not matter for the particular case,
because the taxpayer satisfied both prongs).
A support for the taxpayer’s argument could be found in the Second circuit’s decision in
Gilman v. Commissioner.135 In this case the Tax Court applied the Rice’s Toyota’s
disjunctive test, examined each prong separately, and concluded that the disputed
transaction lacked a business purpose and economic substance. On appeal, the taxpayer
challenged the Tax Court’s use of the disjunctive test and argued that the “relevant
standard for determining economic substance is "whether the transaction may cause any
change in the economic positions of the parties (other than tax savings)," and "that the
'profit motive/business purpose' inquiry should be based on the criteria in the regulations
under section 183."
The Second Circuit supported the Rice’s Toyota’s disjunctive test, thereby rejected the
taxpayer’s argument and held that:
[T]he Tax Court did not demand that the taxpayer demonstrate both business
purpose and economic substance. Rather, the Court examined each prong
separately and concluded that Gilman lacked a business purpose and that the
transaction lacked economic substance.136
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Finally, the Third Circuit acknowledged in ACM Partnership (footnote 31) that even
though it applies the unitary analysis: “it is also well established that where a transaction
objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic position, legal relations, or non-tax
business interests, it will not be disregarded merely because it was motivated by tax
considerations.” Such assertions imply that the absence of business purpose.”
The Third Circuit cited for this proposition in the footnote the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Northen Indiana Pub, Serv. Co. v. Commissioner137:
Gregory and its progeny ‘do not allow the Commissioner to disregard
economic transactions . . . which result in actual, non-tax-related changes in
economic position’ regardless of ‘tax-avoidance motive’ and refusing to
disregard role of taxpayer's foreign subsidiary which performed a
‘recognizable business activity’ of securing loans and processing payments for
parent in foreign markets in exchange for legitimate profit.138
Several other Tax Courts followed the disjunctive test, generally quoting Rice’s Toyota
and Frank Lyon.
In Packard v. Commissioner,139 the Tax Court cited these two cases and held that:
A taxpayer's failure to establish that a transaction was motivated by a business
purpose rather than by tax avoidance is not conclusive, however, that the
transaction was a sham. Rather, if an objective analysis of the transaction
indicates that a reasonable possibility of profit existed apart from tax benefits,
the transaction will not be classified as a sham.
The Tax Court in Torres v. Commissioner,140 followed the same standard two years later
in a sale and leaseback case and held that under the Rice’s Toyota standard:
[a] finding of lack of economic substance is inappropriate if either a business
purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit apart from expected tax benefits is
found to have been present. . . The record herein convincingly demonstrates
that not only did petitioner have a reasonable possibility of realizing a profit
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apart from tax benefits but also that petitioner was virtually assured of
realizing such a profit.141
Because a taxpayer is only required to satisfy one prong, under the disjunctive standard,
even if a court finds that the taxpayer had no, or insignificant, non-tax motivation, it
would validate a transaction if it finds the transaction had objective economic substance.
In Sanderson v. Commissioner,142 the Tax Court held that:
In the instant case, while we have little doubt that tax benefits were a
significant aspect of this transaction, the record establishes the fact that the
investment in the buildings provided a realistic opportunity for economic
profit apart from tax benefits.”
Similarly, the Tax Court in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner143 relied on Horn v.
Commissioner and asserted that “ a transaction imbued with economic substance
normally will be recognized for tax purposes even in the absence of a nontax business
purpose.”
Although in most cases applying the disjunctive test the taxpayer prevailed by showing
objective economic substance, a taxpayer may still prevail on the grounds of having
subjective business purpose, and not having to show objective economic substance.
Citing Rice’s Toyota, the Tax Court indicated in Mukerji v. Commissioner: 144
Once business purpose is established, the transaction should not be classified a
‘sham.’ A finding of no business purpose, however, is not conclusive evidence of
a sham transaction. The transaction will still be valid if it possesses some
modicum of economic substance. Conversely, transactions devoid of economic
substance are not always shams such as where a taxpayer mistakenly believes
there existed a potential for profit. But when there is a finding that the taxpayer
entered into the transaction for tax reasons only, then it is proper to subject the
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transaction to an objective economic analysis to determine whether there could
have been an opportunity for profit.145
6.

Moline Properties146

In Moline Properties, the Supreme Court set forth the standards for recognizing a formal
entity for federal income tax purposes. The taxpayer in Moline Properties, the sole
shareholder of a corporation, attempted to characterize gain from the sale of real
property, title to which was held by the corporation, as gain to the sole shareholder
individually on the grounds that the existence of the corporation was “merely fictitious”
for federal income tax purposes.147 The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer could not
disregard the corporate form of his business organization unless such form was a “sham
or unreal.”148 Courts subsequently have consistently applied this standard in determining
whether a given corporation qualifies as a separate entity.149
Moline Properties set forth a two-prong disjunctive test in determining whether a
separate corporate entity should be recognized, a standard that is equivalent to the
economic substance standard. The first prong applies a subjective standard requiring the
taxpayer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-tax business purpose that is served by the
selection of the corporate form as a separate and independent vehicle for owning and
conducting the activity in question. The second prong applies an objective standard
requiring that the entity has engaged in sufficient business activity. If either prong is
satisfied, the entity will be recognized as a separate entity.150 The amount of business
activity necessary to satisfy the objective standard, however, may be minimal.151
In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner,152 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court’s reliance on the Moline Properties line of cases for “the principle that so
long as a foreign subsidiary conducts substantive business activity--even minimal
activity--the subsidiary will not be disregarded for federal tax purposes, notwithstanding
the fact that the subsidiary was created with a view to reducing taxes.” The Seventh
Circuit held that “[t]hese cases engender the principle that a corporation and the form of
145

Cf. Hines v. United States, where the Fourth Circuit held that: “[t]he mere assertion of such a belief,
particularly in the face of strong objective evidence that the taxpayer would incur a loss, cannot by itself
establish that the transaction was not a sham.”

146

319 U.S. 436 (1943).
319 U.S. at 439.
148
Id. at 438-39.
149
Bollinger v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir.
1945); Nutt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 231 (1962), rem’d on another issue, 351 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1965),
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115 F.3d 506, 513-14 (7th Cir 1997).
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its transactions are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so
long as the corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business transactions.”
As set forth above, the District Court in Black & Decker v. United States153 cited both
Moline Properties and Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (along with Frank Lyon and
Hunt) for the proposition that the economic substance standard is disjunctive. However,
as set forth by the D.C. Circuit in ASA (see above), a taxpayer must prove not only that
the entity was engaged in a business activity, but also that the entity’s transactions were
not sham.154
To conclude, the disjunctive test is clearly more favorable to taxpayer than the
conjunctive test. Taxpayers, therefore, generally attempt to convince the court that it
should apply the disjunctive test, while the Government, naturally, attempts to convince
the court that either the conjunctive test or the unitary analysis is appropriate.155 As set
forth above, in some circuits it is clear enough which standard prevails (Fourth, D.C. and
Federal), while in others, it is up to the taxpayer to convince the court (Eighth, Second).
As a general rule, even if a court applies the disjunctive test, it would settle for a one
prong test only if such test would clearly allow the court to reach a conclusion. Courts
may begin with the subjective prong and if they have enough evidence to validate a
transaction on the grounds that the taxpayer honestly expected an actual profit, there is no
need to utilize an additional objective test. The latter test would be necessary, however,
when the taxpayer cannot prove by clear evidence its honest pursuit for profit. In most
cases, the court would have to apply the objective test. If the court begins with the
objective analysis, it may not need to examine subjective intention if it finds that the
transaction had objective economic substance
7.

The Unitary Analysis
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Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. Oct. 22,
2004).
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“Because ASA "engaged in more than sufficient business activity to be respected as a genuine entity,"
petitioner argues that ASA was a partnership under the second alternative. . .We agree if engaging in
business activity were sufficient to validate a partnership ASA would qualify. It was infused with a
substantial amount in capital ($ 1.1 billion), and invested it in PPNs, LIBOR notes, and other short-term
notes over a period of two years. In fact, however, courts have understood the "business activity" reference
in Moline to exclude activity whose sole purpose is tax avoidance. This reading treats "sham entity" cases
the same way the law treats "sham transaction" cases, in which the existence of formal business activity is a
given but the inquiry turns on the existence of a nontax business motive. See Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361, 364-66, 5 L. Ed. 2d 128, 81 S. Ct. 132 (1960). Thus, what the petitioner alleges to be a twopronged inquiry is in fact a unitary test--whether the "sham" be in the entity or the transaction--under which
the absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal.”
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See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), for
example.

The origins of the unitary analysis are found in Zmuda v. Commissioner, 156where the
ninth circuit indicated that there is no real distinction between the objective and
subjective prongs, and that “[b]oth simply state that the Commissioner may look beyond
the form of an action to discover its substance.”
Under this approach, “[a] taxpayer's subjective business purpose and the transaction's
objective economic substance may be relevant to [the sham transaction] inquiry.”157
Thus, the two prongs are no more than other relevant factors in determining if the
transaction ought to be respected for tax purposes.158 Nevertheless, courts that apply the
unitary analysis often apply the two-prong test, either as a part of the unitary analysis159
or as an alternative test.160
As the Third Circuit indicated in ACM Partnership:
The inquiry into whether the taxpayer's transactions had sufficient economic
substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on both the ‘objective economic
substance of the transactions’ and the ‘subjective business motivation’ behind
them. . . . However, these distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not
constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent
related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had
sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax
purposes.161
Similarly, in Sochin v. Commissioner, 162 the Ninth Circuit used almost the same words,
holding that
[w]e did not intend our decision in Bail Bonds to outline a rigid two-step analysis.
Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply
156

731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Rose, at 853, citing Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, 354, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).
ACM Partnership, at 247 (“[The objective and subjective] distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry
do not constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from its tax
consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”)
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See Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that although tax court did
not apply the "exact test" of Rice's Toyota World, there was nevertheless ample support for the court's
finding of a sham transaction). See also Hines v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1990) ("While it is
important to examine both the subjective motivations of the taxpayer and the objective reasonableness of
the investment, in both instances our inquiry is directed to the same question: whether the transaction
contained economic substance aside from tax consequences.").
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Shriver v. Commissioner, (“Although we elect also to address the question of whether the two-part test
applied in Rice's Toyota World is mandated by the Frank Lyon sham-transaction analysis, the following
discussion only provides an alternative basis for our holding. . . Although we need not reach this issue, that
is -- whether there is a requirement for a two-part analysis -- we do so to point out that such a requirement
is far from settled law, notwithstanding [the taxpayer’s] protestations.)
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ACM Partnership, at 247.
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Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).

more precise factors to consider in the application of this court's traditional sham
analysis; that is, whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other
than the creation of income tax losses.163
The flexible, or unitary, test has been adopted by the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits as well as by several Tax Courts.164 As discussed herein, however,
in some circuits, such as the Second and Eighth, it is not that clear that the unitary test is
the prevailing doctrine. Due to the flexible nature of the unitary standard, different
versions of this flexible analysis have emerged.165 One notable version of this test,
namely the “generic tax shelter” view, is discussed below.
A court applying the unitary analysis would, generally, discuss both prongs, and would
make a decision based on its findings as to these prongs; however, the decision will be
made based on the transaction’s overall effect (in particular, does it have any practical
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purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider in the application of this
court's traditional sham analysis; that is, whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other
than the creation of income tax losses.”); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984)
See also Provizer v. Commissioner, 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993); (stating Rice's Toyota World test but
citing Rose as authority), aff'g per curiam 63 T.C.M. 2531, 2548 (1992); Rosenfeld v. Comr., 706 F.2d
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165 For example of the different types of standards applied by different courts, see Mahoney, 808 F.2d at
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effect other than tax effect), and not on the precise findings for each prong.166 The focus,
therefore, is on the transaction’s effect on the taxpayer, other than a tax effect.
The unitary analysis allows the court to be more flexible with respect to the weight given
to each prong, and, in fact, it also allows the court to completely ignore one prong, if the
court views it unnecessary to apply such prong. As set forth above, in many cases, courts
have presented the two alternative tests, the disjunctive and unitary, and concluded,
generally, that under either test they would have reached the same conclusion (Shriver,
IES, Compaq, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States167). In addition, in those circuits, the
disjunctive test has been used at least one time, and, naturally, taxpayers have attempted
to convince the court to apply this test, while the Government has attempted to persuade
the court that the unitary test ought to apply.
For example, in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States,168 the District Court (whose
decision could be appealed to the Second Circuit), the taxpayer claimed that under the
Second Circuit’s test, a transaction is valid if it has either economic substance or business
purposes.169 The District Court, however, dismissed this argument,170 and thoroughly
discussed the Second Circuit’s flexible view of the economic substance.171 As the court
indicated, “[t]he nature of the economic substance analysis is flexible,. . thereby giving
rise to alternative formulations in the Second Circuit, including both subjective and
objective inquiries.”172
In contrast, in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,173 the court was not as clear as the court
in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States with respect to which doctrine is
predominant in the Second Circuit. The taxpayer asked the court to apply the disjunctive
test, while the government asked it to apply the unitary test. The court did a two prong
analysis and held that the taxpayer had both business purpose and economic substance.
Thus, the court said id did not have to decide which standard to apply.
To conclude, under the unitary standard, instead of applying a rigid two-prong test
(pursuant to which the court must find either lack of economic substance or lack of
business purpose to invalidate the transaction), courts may simply apply a flexible sham
166
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Id. at footnote 68.
Id., citing Ferguson, 29 F.3d at 102 ("Having concluded that the partnerships' . . . activities lacked
economic substance, those activities must be disregarded for tax purposes and cannot form the basis of any
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transaction analysis to determine if the transaction has any benefit to the taxpayer other
than the tax benefit. Practically, however, there is little difference between the unitary
and conjunctive standards, because a court applying the former test would examine both
prongs to reach a conclusion.
8.

“Generic Tax Shelters”

A modified version of the unitary standard has emerged in the Tax Court, defined by
several courts as a “generic tax shelter” standard.174 The Tax Court adopted the "generic
tax shelter" test in Rose v. Commissioner.175 Under this test, transactions involving
"generic tax shelters" are disregarded for tax purposes if the transactions are devoid of
economic substance.176
The Tax Court in Rose v. Commissioner defined a "generic tax shelter" as a transaction
possessing some or all of the following characteristics: 1) promotion by materials that
focus on tax benefits; 2) acceptance of price terms by investors without negotiation; 3)
assets consisting of packages of purported rights that are difficult to value in the abstract
and overvalued in relation to the tangible property included as part of the package; 4)
tangible assets that were acquired or created at a relatively small cost shortly before the
transaction in question; and 5) the deferring of the bulk of consideration by promissory
notes, nonrecourse in form or substance.177
Pursuant to the Tax Court, whether a transaction involving a "generic tax shelter" is
devoid of economic substance under this test is to be determined by evaluating the
following factors: 1) the investment activities of the taxpayers; 2) the relationship
between the asset's price and fair market value; 3) the structure of the financing; and 4)
the perceived congressional intent.178
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision but declined, however, to adopt the
"generic tax shelter" test. According to the Sixth Circuit:
Whether characterized as a 'generic tax shelter' test or a two-prong
subjective/objective analysis, the essential inquiry is whether the transaction
had any practicable economic effect other than the creation of economic tax
losses.179
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Rose v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Whether characterized as a 'generic tax
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the "generic tax shelter" test is similar to the unitary
analysis discussed above. 180 Thus, as the Fourth Circuit indicated in Hunt, there was no
need to adopt another standard.181

III.

Recent Economic-Substance Court Cases
A.

Long Term Capital Holding v. United States182

A U.S. district court held that a transaction involving the contribution of stock with a
built-in loss to a partnership lacked economic substance and had been entered into
without any business purpose other than tax avoidance. Alternatively, the court held that
the transaction could be recast under the step-transaction doctrine as a taxable transfer of
the loss stock from the contributing partner to the general partner, followed by a sale of
the stock by the general partner. Additionally, the court upheld penalties assessed by the
IRS despite the taxpayer's argument that it had obtained and relied on two separate law
firm "should" level opinions supporting its position.
1.

Facts

The essence of the transaction was to allow loss duplication through the contribution by
Onslow Trading & Commercial LLC ("OTC") of stock with a built- in loss to a
partnership, the sale of the contributor's partnership interest to the general partner, and the
subsequent sale of the loss stock by the partnership. The stock with the built-in loss (i.e.,
stock with low value but high tax basis) was created by contributing cash subject to a prepaid lease obligation to two different corporations in a section 351 transactions (“CHIPS”
and “TRIPS”). The key was that the lease obligations were not treated as a liabilities
under section 357, so the basis in the preferred stock was amount of cash contributed,
even though its value was much lower (because it reflected the liabilities). The
petitioners received a "should" level opinion from Shearman & Sterling supporting
OTC's tax basis in the loss stock, and paid approximately $513,000 for the opinion.
In April and November of 1996, OTC contributed cash and the loss stock to Long-Term
Capital Partners LP ("LTCP"), a hedge fund, in exchange for a partnership interest in
LTCP worth approximately $5M.. OTC borrowed the cash component of its contribution
from Long-Term Capital Management UK, a UK entity related to Long-Term Capital
Management LP ("LTCM"), the general partner of LTCP.
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Hunt v. Commissioner, 938 F.2d 466, 471 (4th Cir. 1991).
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In addition, OTC purchased from LTCM a "liquidity put" and a "downside put" with
respect to its interest in LTCP. In general, these puts, each of which could only be
exercised on or between October 27, 1997 and October 31, 1997, gave OTC the right to
put its interest in LTCP to LTCM for an amount equal to the greater of (i) the value of
such interest at the date of the put or (ii) OTC's original capital investment in LTCP. OTC
exercised its liquidity put on October 28, 1997, selling its entire interest in LTCP to
LTCM for $12,614,188, representing approximately a 22% return on OTC's investment.
Of course, no section 754 election was made.
In December 1997, LTCP sold some of the preferred stock with a basis of $107M for
approximately $1M, producing a loss of $106x, which was allocated to LTCM under
section 704(c). King & Spalding rendered a should opinion on the partnership aspects of
the transaction. The opinion was not delivered, however, until 1999. LTCM paid a fee to
K&S of approximately $500K.
Babcock & Brown, which designed the CHIPS and TRIPS transactions and (with help
from Turlington) the partnership transaction and brought OTC and Long Term together,
received a partnership interest in LTCP (held through UBS) and a 12-month consulting
arrangement for unspecified services for which it was paid $1.2 million.
Turlington claimed he had earned a fee for his role in the transaction. This claim was
settled by Long Term paying Turlington $1.25 million and B&B paying $550K.
As manager of the underlying portfolio, LTCM earned fees for assets under management,
proportional to the return achieved for the investors. Long Term relied on the additional
fees it would earn from both the OTC and the B&B investment to justify its ability to
earn a pre-tax profit. In addition, King & Spalding gave a "should" level opinion
regarding the recognition and the allocation of LTCP's loss from its subsequent sale of
the Loss Stock. The IRS disallowed the loss otherwise allocable to LTCM and assessed
penalties.
2.

Economic Substance Analysis

The taxpayer argued that the standard in the Second Circuit is a disjunctive test. Thus,
the taxpayer asked that if the court finds either business purpose or economic substance,
it ought to allow the tax benefits. The court rejected this argument, and held that the
prevailing standard in the Second circuit is the unitary test. Nevertheless, even if the
court would have accepted the disjunctive test, it does not matter, because the court held
that the transaction lacked objective economic substance and also concluded that the
taxpayer entered into the transaction without any business purpose other than tax
avoidance. Alternatively, the court held that the transaction could be recast as a direct
sale of the loss stock by OTC to LTCM under the step-transaction doctrine's "end result"
test.
i.

Objective Economic Substance

Relaying on the cost v. benefit analysis conducted by the Second Circuit in Goldstein v.
Commissioner, the court held that LTCM had no realistic expectation of economic profit
after taking into account fees. The court reviewed the costs incurred by LTCM with
respect to the transaction and held that the taxpayer could not have reasonably expected

to generate a pre-tax profit after considering these costs and fees. In particular, the costs
included legal fees of $1M, the B&B fee of $1.2M, the Turlington settlement of $1.25M,
and various internal allocations and bonuses paid to Long Term principals. With respect
to the potential profit, the court considered only the management fees LTCM could earn
on the OTC investment, not the B&B/UBS investment, because the latter didn’t
contribute to the obtaining of the tax benefits. As a result, maximum reasonably expected
gross earnings were estimated at $2M.
The taxpayer argued that the economic substance test ought to be whether there was a
meaningful change in the taxpayer’s economic position. The court, however, rejected the
argument that a meaningful change in the parties’ economic positions is enough to give
economic substance. The court also rejected the taxpayer’s view that the counterparty’s
business purpose imbues the transaction with business purpose. (Fn. 89)
ii.

Subjective Business Purpose

The court found that the transaction was purely tax-motivated, notwithstanding the
parties’ efforts to imbue it with a business purpose (earning fees). Most notably, the
court asserted that the transaction was brought to Long Term as a tax product.
The transaction was far more complex than necessary to accomplish the stated business
purpose, which was to bring in a new investor so additional fees could be generated. The
court said, “[T]he construction of an elaborate, time consuming, inefficient and expensive
transaction with OTC for the purported purpose of generating fees points to Long Term’s
true motivation, tax avoidance.” The court elaborated with respect to the business
purpose subjective standard that Long Term did not carry out the transaction in a way
that indicated it had any motive other than tax savings. The court implied that the
transaction didn’t have a business purpose because its structure was too complex for a
regular business transaction. Thus, the court implicitly applied a “reasonable means”
test, which, as set forth above, is inconsistent with the majority of courts across all
circuits.183
3.

Step Transactions Analysis

Alternatively, the court held that under the “end result” test of the step transaction
doctrine, the court collapsed the several steps taken by the taxpayer and held that OTC
ought to be viewed as if it sold its preferred stock to LTCM, so LTCM had a cost basis in
the stock.
4.

Penalties

The court found the taxpayers liable for valuation overstatement and substantial
understatement penalties. The court held that the S&S and K&S opinions did not allow
the taxpayers to qualify for the “reasonable cause/good faith” exception to the penalties
183

This standard was proposed in the recent version of the codification, as discussed below, but was not
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because: (i) the K&S written opinion was delivered late, and the record did not establish
that Long Term had reasonably relied on K&S’s oral advice; (ii) there was no evidence
that any of the Long Term partners other than Myron Scholes actually read the K&S
opinion; (iii) the favorable authorities cited in the K&S opinion were based on facts
materially different from those found by the court, so could not be relied upon; (iv) the
K&S opinion did not adequately address Second Circuit precedent, nor the “end result”
variation of the step-transaction doctrine; and (v) Long Term lacked good faith, as
evidenced by the steps it took to conceal the preferred stock losses on its tax return.
5.

Conclusions

The court’s decision contains a thoughtful analysis of the law on economic substance and
business purpose, with heavy emphasis on Second Circuit precedent, but essentially, the
court offered no new doctrine. The case essentially says that a transaction driven
exclusively by tax benefits cannot be dressed up with a thin layer of economic substance
and business purpose. In this respect, it seems to differ little from ACM and similar
cases. Finally, footnote 89 distinguishes the pro-taxpayer decision of the 11th Circuit in
UPS, which , as explained by the District Court, court involved the restructuring of the
taxpayer’s business operation to derive a tax advantage, as opposed to Long Term Capital
holding, which involved a unique transaction having nothing to do with the taxpayer’s
business.
The court’s primary reason for sustaining the penalties asserted by the IRS appeared to be
that the transaction lacked economic substance and business purpose. But the opinion
also suggests that the opinion did not protect the taxpayer because it was deficient in its
legal analysis and because at most one of the partners in LTCM had read the opinion.

B.

Black & Decker Corp. v. United States184

U.S. District Court (in the Fourth Circuit) in Maryland has granted Black & Decker
Corp.'s (B & D) motion for summary judgment in its refund suit for over $ 57 million in
federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction.
1.

Facts

In 1998, B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc. ("BDHMI") and
transferred approximately $ 561 million to BDHMI along with $ 560 million in
contingent employee healthcare claims in exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI, in
a section 351 transaction. Subsequently, B & D sold its stock in BDHMI to a third-party
for $ 1 million.
B & D argued that its basis in the BDHMI stock was $ 561 million (i.e., equal to the
value of the property it had transferred to BDHMI. Thus, B & D claimed approximately
$ 560 million in capital loss on the stock sale, and used a portion of the capital loss to
184
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offset capital gains it had from selling three businesses in 1998, and the remaining loss to
offset gains in prior and future tax years.
Note that In Notice 2001-17,185 the IRS identified as listed transactions such transactions
"involving a loss on the sale of stock acquired in a purported section 351 transfer of a
high basis asset to a corporation and the corporation's assumption of a liability that the
transferor has not yet taken into account for federal income tax purposes." The
transaction in the present case occurred prior to the issuance of Notice 2001-17.
2.

The Parties’ Arguments

The United States argues that the BDHMI transaction was a tax avoidance vehicle that
must be disregarded for tax purposes under the economic substance/sham transaction
doctrine. B & D argues that because the BDHMI transaction had economic substance, it
must be validated. Both parties stipulated that the transaction had no business purpose.
3.

Analysis

Generally, in the Fourth Circuit, a transaction will be treated as a sham (or having no
economic substance) if the court finds "that the taxpayer was motivated by no business
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit
exists.186 In other words, a court will not disallow the tax benefits if the taxpayer can
show either subjective business purpose or an objective economic substance (i.e., a
disjunctive test). “The court may not ignore a transaction that has economic substance,
even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.”187 Accordingly, the BDHMI
transaction cannot be disregarded as a sham.” Thus, for purposes of its motion for
summary judgment, B & D conceded that tax evasion was its sole motivation, and
focused on establishing objective economic substance.
The District Court applied a combination of the Moline Properties doctrine and objective
economic substance analysis to conclude that a corporation and its transactions are
objectively valid, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in
bona fide economically-based business transactions.188
The Court looked at the facts and noted:
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that BDHMI: (1) "assumed the responsibility for the management,
servicing, and administration of plaintiff's employee and retiree health
plans;" [footnote omitted] (2) has considered and proposed numerous
healthcare cost containment strategies since its inception in 1998, many of
which have been implemented by B & D; [footnote omitted] and (3) has
always maintained salaried employees. [footnote omitted]. Moreover, as a
result of the BDHMI transaction, BDHMI became responsible for paying
the healthcare claims of B & D employees, and such claims are paid with
BDHMI assets.
As a result, the court held that “[t]he BDHMI transaction, therefore, had very real
economic implications for every beneficiary of B & D's employee benefits program, as
well as for the parties to the transaction.” Under the disjunctive test, therefore, the court
held for the taxpayer.
C.

TIFD III Inc. v. United States189

U.S. District Court (in the Second Circuit) in Connecticut has ordered the IRS to refund $
62 million to the tax matters partner of Castle Harbour-I LLC, finding that the LLC's
creation was not a sham designed solely to avoid taxes.
1.

Facts

TIFD III-E is a wholly owned subsidiary of the General Electric Capital Corporation
("GECC"), a subsidiary of the General Electric Company ("GE"). GECC leased
commercial aircraft. In 1992, at least partially in response to concerns about the number
of airlines going into bankruptcy, GECC executives began looking for ways to reduce
GECC's risk in the aircraft leasing business.
Because of business limitations, selling the aircraft or borrowing money against them
were not options. In May 1992, GECC submitted Requests for Proposal to seven
investment banks. GECC accepted a proposal that required it to create a separate entity to
which it would contribute a number of aircraft. Investors would then be solicited to
purchase ownership shares in the new entity. The result would be that GECC would trade
some of the risks and returns of those aircraft to the outside investors in exchange for a
cash contribution to the newly created entity. The proposal also called for the investors to
be foreign tax-neutral entities, an arrangement that would offer lucrative tax savings to
GECC.
The proposal was implemented in two stages. First, three GECC subsidiaries formed an
LLC (“Summer Street”) and transferred to it aircraft, nonrecourse debt, rents receivable,
cash, and all the stock of a GECC subsidiary (“TIFD VI”) which had zero value. Second,
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later that same year, the GECC subsidiaries sold $50 million of their interest in Summer
Street to two Dutch banks (“Dutch Banks”). The Dutch Banks also contributed an
additional $67.5 million, bringing their total investment to $117.5 million. Summer Street
then changed its name to Castle Harbour-I Limited Liability Company ("Castle
Harbour"), and TIFD VI changed its name to Castle Harbour Leasing, Inc. ("CHLI").
The partnership allocations were modified after the Dutch Banks were admitted. Under
the operating agreement, each year the Dutch Banks were to have their capital accounts
debited or credited, depending on whether the partnership had received a gain or suffered
a loss, and each year the Dutch Banks were to have a significant portion of their
ownership interest bought out by the partnership. The buyout payments were referred to
as “Exhibit E” payments. At the end of eight years, if the Dutch Banks' capital accounts
had actually earned a rate of return 9.03587%, the Dutch Banks' capital accounts, i.e.,
ownership interests, would be decreased to near zero. Similarly, if the Dutch Banks'
capital accounts were credited with partnership income at a rate less than 9.03587%, the
capital accounts would be negative after eight years; if the capital accounts were credited
at a rate greater than 9.03587%, the capital accounts would be positive. Positive capital
accounts would result in payments to the banks when the partnership wound up; negative
accounts would mean the banks owed money to the partnership. If the banks' interests
were not liquidated after eight years, the banks would still have their capital accounts
credited or debited by allocations of income or loss in successive years.
Castle Harbour was required to maintain "Investment Accounts" for the Dutch Banks.
No cash was paid into these accounts; they merely kept track of a hypothetical
balance. The opening balance of these accounts was the initial investment made by
the Dutch Banks, which was to be recalculated at the time the Dutch Banks exited the
partnership as if every year the balance had been increased by a defined Applicable
Rate but also reduced by the Exhibit E payments. If, when the Dutch Banks exited
Castle Harbour, the Investment Account sum exceeded a specific allocation formula,
that amount would be paid to the Dutch Banks, instead of the amount in their capital
accounts.
The operating agreement defined two categories of income: Operating Income and
Disposition Gains/Losses. Operating Income was comprised of income less expenses.
Income was rent and interest on investments. Expenses consisted of normal
administrative expenses, interest owed on aircraft debt, depreciation of the aircraft, and
guaranteed payments to GECC entities. Once Operating Income had been calculated, it
was allocated to the capital accounts as follows. If Operating Income was positive, i.e., an
Operating Gain, it was allocated 98% to the Dutch Banks and 2% to the GECC entities. If
Operating Income was negative, i.e., an Operating Loss, then it was (a) first allocated in
an amount sufficient to offset the cumulative Disposition Gains allocated to any of the
partners in previous years, (b) the remainder was then allocated 98% to the Dutch Banks
until they had been allocated, cumulatively, $3,854,493 of Operating Losses, and (c) the
remainder was allocated 99% to the GECC entities and 1% to the Dutch Banks.
A Disposition Gain or Loss was the result of the difference between the sale price of an
asset, usually an aircraft, and its book value. Disposition Gains and Losses were allocated

much like Operating Losses: (a) first, Disposition Gains were allocated to offset prior
Disposition Losses and prior Operating Losses; Disposition Losses offset prior
Disposition Gains, (b) the remainder was then allocated 90% to the Dutch Banks until
they had been allocated, $2,854,493 of either Disposition Gains or Losses, (c) the
remainder was allocated 99% to the GECC entities and 1% to the Dutch Banks.
2.

Economic Substance Analysis

As the court indicated “a transaction will be deemed a ‘sham’ and disregarded when
calculating taxes if it has no business purpose or economic effect other than the creation
of tax benefits.190 There is no dispute that the Castle Harbour transaction created
significant tax savings for GECC. The critical question, however, is whether the
transaction had sufficient economic substance to justify recognizing it for tax
purposes.”191
The court moved on to discuss the two-prong test:
To determine whether a transaction has economic substance or is, instead,
a ‘sham’ a court must examine both the subjective business purpose of the
taxpayer for engaging in the transaction and the objective economic effect
of the transaction.192
The taxpayer argued that the court must apply the disjunctive test pursuant to which if the
court would find either a subjective business purpose or objective economic substance,
the transaction is not a sham. The government, however, urged the court to apply a
flexible two-prong standard that considers both factors but makes neither dispositive (i.e.,
the unitary analysis).
The court asserted that the decisions in the Second Circuit are inconsistent with respect to
which test to apply. It also cited Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States193 as an
example for applying the unitary analysis. The court, however, did not have to decide
which standard to apply, because, as the judge stated “under either reading I would
conclude that the Castle Harbour transaction was not a ‘sham.’” The transaction had both
a non-tax economic effect and a non-tax business motivation, satisfying both tests and
requiring that it be given effect under any reading of the law.”
i.

Economic Substance
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The Government argued that because the return earned by the Dutch banks was
essentially guaranteed, it had no risk with respect to the transaction, and this means,
according to the Government, that there was no economic effect. The court dismissed
this argument. In return for a significant portion of Castle Harbour's Operating Income,
stated the court, the Dutch Banks contributed approximately $117 million dollars, which
was used by Castle Harbour's subsidiary CHLI either to purchase aircraft or to retire
GECC debt. Although the Investment Accounts provided the Dutch Banks with some
guarantee of return, lack of risk is not enough to make a transaction economically
meaningless, stated the court. Even with an 8.5% guaranteed return, the Dutch Banks still
participated in the economically real upside of the leasing business. Participating in
upside potential, even with some guarantee against loss, determined the court, is
economically substantial. Further, noted the court, the government's premise that a
guarantee of a positive return indicates no risk, is simplistic. Whether an investment is
"risky" to the investor depends on a number of factors, including the investor's cost of
capital and opportunity costs. The court concluded that “[t]he economic reality of such a
transaction is hard to dispute.”
ii.

Business Purpose

“In evaluating the economic substance of a transaction, courts are cautioned to give
more weight to objective facts than self- serving testimony.”194
The court found that the transaction had a legitimate business purpose; specifically,
that GECC entered into the transaction to raise capital and, more importantly, to
demonstrate to investors, rating agencies, and GECC senior management, that it
could raise capital on its fleet of aging Stage II aircraft. In light of the economic
reality of the Castle Harbour transaction, the court found persuasive the testimony of
five GECC executives, who all swore that "demonstrating liquidity" and
"monetizing" Stage II aircraft were important motivations. The court found the
testimony of GECC's executives persuasive. Consequently, it held that GECC was
subjectively motivated to enter into the Castle Harbour transaction, at least in part, by
a desire to raise capital and a desire to demonstrate its ability to do so.
3.

Economic Substance of the Partnership

Alternatively, the government argued that even if the transaction as a whole had
economic substance, for tax purposes the Dutch banks were not partners of the
GECC entities but rather were their creditors. The court identified two
circumstances under which the Dutch banks would not be considered partners: (1)
if there was no economic reality to the label "partner;" and (2) if, regardless of the
economics of the situation, the Code would simply classify them as something
else. The court applied a separate economic substance analysis to the first
circumstance, but, rather than examining the substance of the entire transaction, it
focused on “whether there was any economic reality to the choice of the
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partnership form.” As to the second circumstance, the court held that there is no
current authority for it to re-classify an interest in a partnership as something else.
First, the court emphasized that:
I concluded that the transaction that created Castle Harbour was not a
sham. In other words, I concluded there was valid business purpose and
economic reality in the arrangement by which the GECC entities and the
Dutch Banks came together to form Castle Harbour, i.e., there was
economic substance in not only the actions, but also the formation, of the
partnership.
The decision to form a partnership, noted the court, may be economically
insubstantial, even though the partnership undertakes a legitimate business. Here,
the court found that there was economic substance in not only the actions, but also
the formation, of the partnership. The court distinguished this case from the
situations in ASA Investerings P’ship v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir
2000) [add link], mainly on the grounds that in ASA, the foreign partners were
entirely indifferent to the partnership’s activities (because their return was 100%
guaranteed), as opposed to the present case where the Dutch Banks could have
suffered some downside (albeit limited) and could have earned more profit than
the guaranteed return. In the present case, the Dutch Banks had a very real stake
in the transaction because their return was tied directly to the performance of the
aircraft leasing business.

D.

Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States195

A U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ordered the IRS to refund to Coltec Industries Inc. $
82.8 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction. The first
paragraph of the decisions provided a clear indication of what the decision is going to be.
The court cited Atlantic Coast Line v. Phillips196 quoting from prior decisions of Justice
Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, observed:
As to the astuteness of taxpayers in ordering their affairs so as to minimize
taxes we have said that 'the very meaning of a line in the law is that you
intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.' This is
so because [there is no] 'public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.'197
1.

Facts
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Coltec Industries, Inc. ("Coltec") a publicly-traded holding company owns Garlock, Inc.
("Garlock"). Garlock's companies include, Garlock Mechanical Packing Company,
Stemco, Inc. and Anchor Packing ("Anchor"). The latter is a manufacturer and distributor
of industrial gaskets, pump packings, valves, and mechanical seals. Anchor utilized
asbestos in manufacturing these products. In 1993, Coltec decided to discontinue
Anchor's business operations and by 1996, Anchor's only assets were nearly depleted
insurance coverage and a small building in Louisiana. By the early 1990's, Anchor and
Garlock were or had been defendants in approximately 100,000 asbestos cases.
In 1996, Coltec established “Garrison,” a "case management subsidiary," to handle the
asbestos cases. Garrison authorized the issuance of 300,000 shares of common stock and
1,500,000 shares of Class A stock. Coltec contributed $ 998,000 to Garrison in exchange
for 99,800 shares of Garrison common stock and $ 13,000,000 in exchange for 1,300,000
shares of Garrison Class A stock.
To effect capitalization of Garrison, Garlock caused Stemco to issue a promissory note to
Garlock in the amount of $ 375 million. Garlock contributed to Garrison the Stemco
Note, the outstanding stock of Anchor, the rights to any future asbestos insurance
recoveries, furniture, fixtures, and equipment, and all of the files, records, and data of the
Asbestos Litigation Department. In exchange, Garrison issued 100,000 shares of
Garrison common stock to Garlock and assumed defense and payment of Garlock's and
Anchor's contingent asbestos liabilities.
On December 1996, several banks' subsidiaries purchased 50,000 shares of Garrison
common stock for $ 250,000 or 100,000 shares for a total of $ 500,000 or $ 5 per share.
In return, Coltec agreed to indemnify the Banks for any asbestos related claims that may
arise in the future. An exit strategy was set forth in a separate agreement wherein the
banks were granted the right to "put" the Garrison shares to Coltec at fair market value,
and Coltec had the right to "call" or buy back the shares at a fixed price; each option right
was executable after five years. The Banks have not exercised their put rights and Coltec
has not exercised its call options.
2.

Analysis

The court examined the transaction using a three step analysis. First, it examined
whether the contribution of the Anchor stock and Stemco promissory note to Garrison
was qualified property under section 351 and therefore, non-recognition of gain or loss on
the exchange was justified. Second, the court reviewed whether the Garloc’s basis in the
Garison’s stock ought to be reduced because of Garrison's assumption of the
shareholder’s contingent asbestos liabilities. This step required an examination whether
the contingent liabilities constitute "liabilities" under either section 257 or 358(d).
Finally, the court explored the question whether the sale of Garrison stock to the banks,
which generated the loss, should be respected.

In addition, the court applied the business purpose test contained in section 357(b) as well
as, separately, the common law economic substance test to the transaction, and under
both standards, held that the transaction was not motivated solely by tax motivations.
i.

Section 351

The court held that the contribution of the stock and the promissory notes to Garrison
satisfied section 351 because (i) Coltec and Garlock transferred qualifying "property"
(i.e., the stock and notes) to Garrison; (ii) Coltec and Garlock received only stock from
Garrison (Coltec received 93% of the equity of Garrison and Garlock received 7% of the
equity of Garrison); and (iii) immediately after the exchange, Coltec and Garlock owned
and controlled 100% of the total combined voting power of all classes of Garrison stock
entitled to vote. Thus, the requirements of section 351 were met in this case.
ii.

Garlock’s Basis in the Stock

Pursuant to section 358(d)(1), in a stock exchange to which section 351 applies, the
assumption of liabilities by another party to the stock exchange is treated as money
received by the distribute upon the exchange, and, therefore, the distributee’s basis in the
stock received ought to be reduced to the extent of the amount of the liabilities assumed.
Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(2)(j) provides that, for an accrual method taxpayer, a liability "is
incurred, and generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes, in the
taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability
[and] the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
In the present case, the court held that the asbestos liabilities assumed by Garrison
were contingent, since both of the events necessary to establish the fact of the
liability had not occurred, i.e., the filing of a lawsuit asserting a claim and an
adjudication of liability. Thus, because section 358(h) was enacted only in 1999
and did not apply to the transaction, the court held that Garlock will reduce its
basis in the Garrison stock if and when the liabilities accrue and are satisfied by
Garrison.
iii.

Sale of the Stock

The court restated the principle that a sale occurs if the benefits and burdens of ownership
have passed from the seller to the buyer. The Government attempted to show that the
purchasers of the Garrison stock did not obtain the burdens and benefits of ownership on
the stock. The court, however, rejected the Government’s arguments on the following
grounds: (i) the stock entitled the banks to a proportionate distribution upon liquidation,
similarly to the stock , but were only required to provide Coltec with notice On such a
sale; (iii) regarding the control issue, the Banks acquired a minority position in Garrison,
and their rights were typical to any minority interest in a company (i.e., they could not
expected to control the company); (iv) the banks had stakes in Garrison through the life
of the venture; and (v) the banks were concerned about veil piercing and they too formed
separate corporations to insulate their main business and required further indemnification

from Coltec. Finally, tThe court also concluded that the transaction was made in arm’s
length.
3.

Section 357(b) – Tax Avoidance (or Business Purpose) Test

The court tested to see if Garrison's assumption of the Garlock liabilities was not
undertaken for "the principal purpose . . . to avoid federal income tax[.]" under section
357(b). In addition, the court required that Coltec demonstrate that assumption of such
liabilities also had a "bona fide business purpose." Both of these "tests" must be
established by a "clear preponderance of the evidence." Section 357(c).
The court reviewed several cases discussing section 357(b) and set forth the following
prevailing principles:
(i) business purpose is to be examined "narrow[ly] to a purpose 'with respect to the
assumption' [of a liability] and to a purpose to avoid income tax 'on the exchange."198 (ii)
the closer the nature of the liabilities to the customary business of the transferee and its
continued viability, the more likely that Section 357(b) 's principle ’business purpose’ test
will be satisfied;199 (iii) if the liabilities were incurred well before the transfer of stock,
the more likely it is they will be considered as incurred for a business purpose and not tax
avoidance;200 and (iv) the longer the life span of the corporate vehicle utilized and term of
any promissory notes issued, the more likely a court will find the transaction to have been
undertaken for a "business purpose.”201
The court concluded that the taxpayer satisfied these test. First, the contingent liabilities
assumed “clearly were related to Anchor's, Garlock's, and Garrison's ordinary business,
and the management and minimization of such liabilities was essential to the continued
viability of Anchor and potentially Garlock.” Second, the court noted that the events that
gave rise to the contingent liabilities “took place well before the Garrison transaction.”
In addition, the court observed that “the fact that the Stemco promissory note had a 15
year term and that Garlock, Stemco, and Garrison continue to function today -- eight
years after the formation of Garrison also weighs in favor of the Garrison transaction
being viewed as having a bona fide business purpose.” Finally, the court evaluated the
overall result of establishing Garrisson and held that “the separate Garrison structure
became an important factor in Coltec's ability to sell the company to B.F. Goodrich
Corporation in 1999.”
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The court concluded that “for these reasons, the court has determined that the record in
this case establishes that Garrison's assumption of Garlock's contingent asbestos
liabilities had a "bona fide" business purpose that satisfied Section 357(b) by a clear
preponderance of the evidence.”
4.

Economic Substance Analysis

The court began by stating the principle that the economic substance doctrine is ‘a
composite of the ’business purpose’ doctrine, the ,’substance over form’ doctrine, and the
’sham transaction’ doctrine.” Thus, the court, in one sentence, collapsed all four
common law doctrines into one single standard. The Government provided the court
with the usual list of "binding precedent" that "supports the principle that economic
substance, and not mere formal compliance with the Code, must inform the interpretation
and application of the tax law, " including Gregory v. Helvering and Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co The court, however, emphasized that ”[a] careful reading of other
cases cited by the Government, however, reveals that the Court resolved the tax question
at issue first by looking to the Code and utilized doctrinal language only to further
support its conclusion.” Thus, as set forth in greater detail below, a court will apply
common law doctrines only where the statute is unclear an open to several
interpretations.
Furthermore, the Federal court of Claims reviewed the three cases cited by the
government from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to conclude
that all three did not endorse the use of the economic substance doctrine.202
The court, however, stated that even if it was required to apply the economic substance
test, Coltec has satisfied the test because it satisfied the busijness purpose of section 357
(b), and, therefore “the ’economic substance’ doctrine is satisfied, since that doctrine
requires proof of at least one of these tests.”203
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Finally, the court supported its conclusion that the transaction had economic substance on
the grounds that “from the ‘standpoint of the prudent investor,’ the Garrison transaction
not only appeared to place one more barrier in the way of veil piercing claims, but it
provided the B.F. Goodrich Corporation with a sufficient comfort level to purchase all of
the Coltec Group in 1999.204
The court cited Joseph Bankman with agreement, stating that "Congress may have no
choice but to engage in substantive law reform. Some shelter activity will take place
under even the most utopian tax structure. However, the current tax treatment of capital
needlessly multiplies shelter opportunities and provides a fertile breeding ground for
shelter development."205
Thus, the court concluded that “[u]nder our time-tested system of separation of powers, it
is Congress, not the court, that should determine how the federal tax laws should be used
to promote economic welfare. . Accordingly, the court has determined that where a
taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress, as Coltec did in
this case, the use of the economic substance doctrine to trump "mere compliance with the
Code would violate the separation of powers.”
IV.

Legislative Proposals to Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine
A.

Overview

In recent years, several legislative proposals to “codify” or “clarify” the economic
substance doctrine have been made. These proposals, however, have been criticized not
only by commentators but also by Government officials on various grounds.206 In
general, all recent proposals state that the economic substance requirement is a
conjunctive two-prong test and cannot be satisfied by reason of a transaction's having a
economic substance doctrine] engender[s] the principle that a corporation and the form of its transactions
are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in
bona fide economically- based business transactions."); Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d
89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the
taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the
transaction[.]"); Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 at 6
(N.D. Md. Oct. 22, 2004) (holding that a "court may not ignore a transaction that has economic substance,
even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.).
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potential for profit unless both (a) the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax
profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected
tax benefits and (b) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction exceeds a
risk- free rate of return. As of today, Congress has adopted none of these proposals.
Recently, the JOBS Act of 2004 was signed by the president in October 22, 2004, leaving
out the latest version of the proposed codification.
B.

History
1.

1999-2000: Treasury’s and Joint Committee on Taxation’s Reports
on Tax Shelters

In 1999, both Treasury and the joint Committee on Taxation released comprehensive
reports discussion corporate tax shelters and suggested alternative routes to fight such
transaction. Both reports have officially suggested, for the first time, the possibility
of “codifying” the common law doctrine of economic substance. In its July 1999
Report on Tax Shelters, Treasury suggested to codify the economic substance
doctrine.207 As set forth above, Treasury suggested that “[a] tax avoidance
transaction would be defined as any transaction in which the reasonably expected pretax profit (determined on a present value basis, after taking into account foreign taxes
as expenses and transaction costs) of the transaction are insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected net tax benefits.” Thus, Treasury suggested to apply a single
objective standard rather than the two prong test.
A similar proposal was included in the Clinton Administration’s Budget Proposal for
the Fiscal Year 2001.208
The Joint Committee on Taxation proposed a similar standard in its July 1999 report.
Under the Joint Committee’s proposal tax benefits will be disallowed in “[t]he
reasonably expected pretax profit from the arrangement is insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected tax benefits." 209
2.

2001-2002: First Drafts

During 2001-2002, two legislative proposals were made pursuant to which the
economic substance doctrine would be codified as part of section 7701.210 Under
proposed new section 7701(m)(B):
A transaction has economic substance only if--
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(I)
the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
Income Tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and
(II) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into
such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing
such purpose.
Thus, the proposal adopted the two-prong conjunctive test. Congress, however, has
not adopted these proposals during 2001 and 2002.
3.

2003-2004: Jobs Acts and Various Similar Proposals

During 2003, the attempts to codify or clarify the doctrines continued with the
introduction of two almost identical proposed provisions in: (i) the Jobs and Growth
Reconciliation Tax Act of 2003 (Pub. Law No. 108-27), as reported by the Senate
Finance Committee on May 8, 2003, and passed by the Senate on May 16, 2003;211
and (ii) the Care Act of 2003, passed by the Senate on April 9, 2003.212
Consistent with previous years’ versions, both proposals set forth that a transaction has
economic substance only if: (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from
federal tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position; (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial
non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction; and (iii) the transaction is a reasonable
means of accomplishing that purpose.
In addition, consistent with previous proposed codifications, both proposals stated that
the economic substance requirement cannot be satisfied by reason of a transaction's
211
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having a potential for profit unless both (a) the present value of the reasonably expected
pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the
expected tax benefits and (b) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction
exceeds a risk-free rate of return. In determining pre-tax profit for this purpose, fees and
foreign taxes are treated as expenses.
On July 25, 2003, House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas introduced the
“American Jobs Creation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2896), which was the follow-up proposal to
the American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002 (H.R. 5095).
The "American Jobs Creation Act of 2003," did not include the proposal to codify the
economic substance doctrine..
Nevertheless, on September 18, 2003, Sens. Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, and Max
Baucus, D-Mont., the chair and ranking minority member of the Senate Finance
Committee, introduced the Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act of 2003, S.
1637. Section 401 of the JOBS Act would codify the economic substance doctrine,
consistent with the Charity, Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) Act.

4.

The JOBS Act of 2004

On May 11, 2004, the JOBS Act passed the Senate by a 92-5 vote. This later version,
which was not included in the legislation signed by the president in October 22, 2004,
was generally consistent with previous proposals, and applies the rigid two-prong test.
Set forth below is a summary of the recent proposed version.
i.

Scope of the Doctrine

The proposed standard applies only if a court determines that the economic substance
doctrine is relevant for the disputed transaction.213 If the court determines that the
doctrine is relevant, the transaction will be validated only if the proposed standard
discussed below is met.214 Thus, a court may simply decide that there is no need to apply
the doctrine on a transaction. For example, as set forth above, in Coltec Industries, the
Federal Court of Claims cited several cases for the proposition that when the language of
the Internal Revenue Code is clear, common law doctrines may not be applied.
Pursuant to proposed IRC 7701(n)(3)(A), the term “economic substance doctrine” means
“the common law doctrine under which tax benefits with respect to a transaction are not
213

Proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(a) would set forth that: “[i]n any case in which a court determines that the
economic substance doctrine is relevant for purposes of this title to a transaction (or series of transactions),
such transaction (or series of transactions) shall have economic substance only if the requirements of this
paragraph are met.”
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allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business
purpose.” Thus, under the proposal, it is a conjunctive test. Note that the proposed
codification only applies to business. For individuals, the doctrine applies only to
transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in
for the production of income.215
The proposed legislation sets forth that other common law doctrines are not affected. 216
Nevertheless, as set forth above, there is a strong relationship between the economic
substance doctrine and other common law doctrines such as the substance-over-form,
sham transaction and business purpose doctrines. Thus, it is unclear to what extent these
doctrines would not be affected. In addition, it is unclear whether a court can decide not
to apply the economic substance doctrine but to apply the sham transaction standard, and
if the court chooses to do so, can the court apply the common law standard as opposed to
the proposed codification? These questions remain unanswered.
ii.

Rigid Two-Prong Test

Consistent with previous codification proposals, the proposed legislation suggested that a
transaction will have economic substance only if (i) the transaction changes in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and
(ii) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into such transaction and
the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose.217
There are two main problems with this proposed conjunctive standard. First, as set forth
above, courts are divided with respect to how to apply the two-prong test, and, certainly,
several recent cases discussed herein have indicated that it is not so common to apply the
rigid two-prong conjunctive test. Second, as discussed herein, the proposed prongs do
not reflect the prevailing authorities on economic substance. With respect to the first
prong, various courts have applied a reasonable expectation for profit test rather than the
broader test suggested in the proposed legislation. Second, and more significantly, the
second requirement of the subjective test implies that the subjective prong would require
not only that the taxpayer has significant nontax purpose, but also that the taxpayer is not
free to choose how to get there.
iii.

Relying on Potential for Profit

As stated above, many taxpayers attempt to assert that their transaction has economic
substance by virtue of having potential for profit. Under Proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(ii),
if a taxpayer attempts to rely on profit potential, “[a] transaction shall not be treated as
having economic substance by reason of having a potential for profit unless (i) the
present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial
215
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in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if
the transaction were respected, and (ii) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction exceeds a risk-free rate of return.”
The first part of the proposed rule requires that not only the potential profit ought to be
more than de-minimis, it must significant in relation to the expected net tax benefits from
the disputed transaction. As set forth above, this principle has been accepted only by a
few courts, and is clearly inconsistent with decisions across all circuits and courts.
Commentators have criticized the comparison with tax benefits approach,218 and the
risk- free minimum return approach.219 As commentators indicated, rather than
“codifying” or “clarifying” a common law doctrine, the proposed legislation would
set forth a new and higher standard, which has not been adopted by the vast majority
of courts.220 For example, the proposed legislation would change the objective
standard from “reasonable possibility of profit” to “reasonably-expected pretax
profit,”221 a change that is inconsistent with the vast majority of cases.222 Various
commentators have warned that the proposed legislation could apply to common tax
structuring and otherwise clearly permissible transactions.223 For example, certain
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types of financial transactions such as swaps might be treated as lacking economic
substance even if clearly entered into for business reasons.
Note that pursuant to IRC 7701(n)(1)(C), for purposes of the profit potential test,
“[f]ees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes shall be taken into account as
expenses in determining pre-tax profit.”
iv.

Certain Business Purposes (GAAP Benefits) are
Ignored

Taxpayers have argued that a purpose of having a financial accounting benefit is enough
to satisfy the business purpose prong of the two-prong test. Proposed IRC
7701(n)(1)(II)(i) clarifies that for purposes of the subjective business purpose prong “[a]
purpose of achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be taken into account in
determining whether a transaction has a substantial nontax purpose if the origin of such
financial accounting benefit is a reduction of income tax.”
v.

Special Rules for Certain Transaction with TaxIndifferent Parties

Financing Transaction: The form of a transaction which is in substance a borrowing of
money, or the acquisition of financial capital directly or indirectly, from a tax-indifferent
party, shall not be respected if the present value of the deductions to be claimed with
respect to the transaction is substantially in excess of the present value of the anticipated
economic return of the lender. A public offering shall be treated as a borrowing, or an
acquisition of financial capital, from a tax-indifferent party if it is reasonably expected
that at least 50 percent of the offering will be placed with tax-indifferent parties.224
A “tax indifferent party” is defined as “any person or entity not subject to tax imposed by
subtitle A [of the Internal Revenue Code]. A person shall be treated as a tax-indifferent
party with respect to a transaction if the items taken into account with respect to the
transaction have no substantial impact on such person’s liability under subtitle A [of the
Internal Revenue Code].”225
Income Shifting or Basis Adjustments: The form of a transaction with a tax-indifferent
party shall not be respected if (i) it results in an allocation of income or gain to the taxindifferent party in excess of such party’s economic income or gain, or (ii) it results in a
basis adjustment or shifting of basis on account of overstating the income or gain of the
tax-indifferent party.226
A. Hyde and Glen Arlen Kohl, The Shelter Problem Is Too Serious Not To Change The Law, 2003 TNT
130-44 (July 03, 2003).
224
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vi.

Understatement Penalty for Non-economic Substance
Transactions

Section 404 of the JOBS Act of 2004 also suggested to add new IRC 6662B, imposing an
understatement penalty for “non-economic substance transactions. This provision was
also not included in the bill signed by the president in October 22, 2004. “Noneconomic
substance transaction” exists if (A) there is a lack of economic substance, or (B) the
transaction fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.227
Pursuant to proposed IRC 6662B(a), “[i]f a taxpayer has an noneconomic substance
transaction understatement for any taxable year, there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to 40 percent of the amount of such understatement.” The penalty rate is reduced to
20% for a transaction with respect to which the relevant facts are disclosed in the return
or a statement attached to the return.228Finally, under section 417 of the JOBS Act of
2004, revised IRC 163(m) would disallow interest deductions which is attributable to a
noneconomic substance transaction understatement (as defined in section 6662B(c)).”
V.

Conclusion and Proposal

Since Frank Lyon, circuits have been divided on how to apply the two prong test. As set
forth above, the inconsistency is reflected in several ways. First, each circuit has chosen
a different path pertaining to the test; some circuits apply the conjunctive test, others
apply a disjunctive test, and the rest apply a unitary analysis. In addition, there are some
inconsistencies within some circuits, such as the Second and the Eighth Circuit. In fact,
almost every circuit has applied, at least once, the disjunctive test. Tax Courts are also
divided and do not follow a uniform standard.
The last three months have showed that the confusion is about to grow. The recent court
cases discussed herein illustrate not only circuits are applying the economic substance
inconsistently, but also within a certain circuit there could be inconsistent application of
the two-prong test. While the court in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States229
seemed convinced that the prevailing standard in the Second Circuit is the unitary
analysis (rejecting the taxpayer’s attempted reliance on Gilman v. Commissioner), the
court in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States230 did not dismiss the taxpayer’s assertion that
the Second Circuit could apply the disjunctive test.231 As set forth above, most circuits
have discussed, at least once, the possibility of applying the disjunctive test. The Court
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of Claims in Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States232 not only held that the disjunctive
test is the relevant one, but also decided that a section 357(b) business purpose analysis is
adequate for purposes of satisfying the two-prong test. By contrast, in Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States,233 involving an equivalent situation, the parties stipulated that the
taxpayer had no business purpose as a factual matter, and the court only focused on
economic substance. Finally, the court in Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States234applied the Fourth Circuit’s disjunctive test using a unique combination of Rice’s
Toyota (the prevailing authority in the Fourth Circuit) and Moline Properties.
The rejection of the proposed codification of the economic substance doctrine discussed
herein added to the confusion regarding the appropriate application of the two-prong test.
As set forth above, the proposed legislation suggested a standard which would be not
only inconsistent, but also more rigid, than the prevailing standards among all circuits.
Thus, the rejection, for now, of the proposed codification is justified, because rather than
“codify” or “clarify” the doctrine, the proposed legislation would have created a new
higher standard, clearly inconsistent with most authorities discussed herein.
In the absence of codification, it is up to the courts and the IRS to search for uniformity.
Having reviewed numerous cases involving economic substance analysis across all
circuits and courts, I believe that a possible solution, which would be acceptable by all
circuits, could be to transform the two-prong test into a single, flexible objective
standard. Such a standard would, in fact, revive the original substance-over-form
analysis conducted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, and would not
seem to contradict the current standard applied by all circuits.
Specifically, I suggest that the standard would simply be whether the transaction had any
economic effect on the taxpayer, apart from tax benefits. In particular, if potential profit
from the transaction is measurable, the test should be whether the reasonably expected
profit from the transaction exceeded the expected costs. This, is, as the reader would
immediately observe, the prevailing standard for the objective prong of the two prong
test, and the question is what do we do with the subjective prong, and how do we
reconcile it with the view in the Fourth Circuit, for example?. The answer is that in the
vast majority of cases, even the ones applying the two prong test, the subjective intent has
been incorporated into the objective analysis, either by examining the subjective intent on
an objective basis, or simply by inferring business purpose in case where the court found
objective economic substance. Put broadly, it is much more likely that a court would first
find economic substance and than infer business purpose than the converse situation
where the court would infer economic substance from a subjective analysis of the
taxpayer’s intent. In addition, it is very unlikely that a court, even in the Fourth Circuit,
would validate a transaction on the grounds that it had business purpose but not economic
substance. (see Hines, for example) but much more likely that a court applying the
disjunctive test would first find objective economic substance and validate the transaction
with no need to examine business purpose. For those who still view the subjective prong
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as essential, the subjective test could remain relevant, but only as one factor among others
in the overall determination of economic substance.
Adoption of such a standard, therefore, would not seem to be inconsistent with the
prevailing disjunctive test, because courts would simply collapse the twp prongs into a
single test, that reflects the standard such courts have been applying.
Courts applying the conjunctive test would also find this test not inconsistent with their
standard, because as of today, such courts must conduct an objective analysis regardless
of the subjective test, and, again, it is very likely that a court finding economic substance
would validate a transaction by inferring business purpose.
Finally, courts applying the unitary analysis would find it easy to adjust to such a
standard, because, in essence, the flexible nature of the unitary analysis allows them to
focus on one prong, and, most courts have focused anyway on the objective prong.
In addition, the subjective prong is generally mute in cases involving business entities,
because, in general, business entities are created and operate to make a profit. Thus, it is
implicit that a business entity will have a business purpose for any transaction the
expected benefits of which exceed the expected costs.235 With respect to individuals,
various statutory rules, including sections 108, 165 and 183, contain subjective business
purpose requirements (usually in the form of a “primarily-for-profit requirement) for
purposes of validating a deduction, and such rules ought to govern in the applicable
cases.
In addition, I suggest that the comparison between tax benefits and nontax benefits would
not be followed, not only because it is inconsistent with the vast majority of cases across
all circuits, but also because it is unfair to taxpayer entering into transaction with
expectations for a more than de-minimis profit and potential risk of loss. From Gregory
v. Helvering to Compaq, courts have clearly stated that a taxpayer may have significant
tax motivation, as long is at has some nontax purpose, and as long as the latter is
meaningful, neither the court nor the IRS can establish a higher standard.
For the same reasons, a requirement that the taxpayer earns at least a risk–free return
should not be adopted. In other words, there are no legal grounds for the proposition that
the taxpayer must make at least a certain return on a transaction in order to be eligible for
the tax benefits associated with the transaction.
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